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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS:
AN AUSTRIAN APPROACH
by Fiammetta Elena Zahnd
This thesis applies Austrian economic theory to envi
ronmental goods.

It emphasizes capital, interest and en

trepreneurial satisfaction of consumer demand for environ
mental goods.

Although provision of several types of envi

ronmental goods is mentioned, the final application is to
groundwater resources.
Both capital and consumer environmental goods must be
privately owned and freely exchanged to generate market
prices that are used to determine whether capital is being
maintained and whether production satisfies consumer demand.
Political control wastes resources and causes conflicts.
Prior appropriation is the best legal system for recognition
of water property titles.

Private ownership of water does

not preclude cooperation.

Private corporations could hire

teams of hydrologists and engineers to manage aquifers for
maximum shareholder value.
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CHAPTER I

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
Environmentalists may despise economic theory as an il
legitimate and offensive technique for affixing monetary
prices to invaluable environmental goods, yet environmental
policy makers may welcome economic theory as a bastion of
objectivity that can generate "bottom line" figures.
Environmentalists, people concerned about the quality
and quantity of environmental goods, correctly sense that
there may be something illegitimate about payment schemes
devised by planners.

Economics is the science of human ac

tion, of human choice of goals and the means to achieve
them.

Freedom is necessary for choice.

erced, prices are distorted.

When action is co

They no longer clearly reflect

the subjective valuations of acting individuals.

Economic

theory explains the general distortions caused by coercion,
but the underlying real data of the economy cannot be cor
rectly ascertained when human action is coerced.

Prices

emerge as more complex or higher order human phenomena that
are based on the more fundamental phenomena of human subjec
tive valuation and voluntary exchange.

Monetary amounts re

quested under coercion as payment for environmental goods
are not prices.

Economic theory can say very little about
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such requested payments except that they are arbitrary.
Therefore, they cannot achieve the distribution of environ
mental goods desired by individuals in the economy.
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
Although environmentalists have the correct hunch about
arbitrary payment schemes, they may have overlooked how eco
nomic theory can help them to provide environmental goods.
Part of the motivation for the current environmental move
ment is the recognition that many environmental amenities
which were available in abundance have become scarce.

Many

people now purchase bottled purified water for drinking, and
filters and ionizers to provide clean air to breathe in
their homes.
air.

In Mexico City, vending machines supply clean

Clean air and water near population centers are not

free goods.
A good is an economic good if it is scarce.

Scarcity

means that not everyone who wants the good can have as much
as he or she desires without giving up something else to get
it.

If a good is available in such a large supply that ev

eryone who wants some of it can have as much as he or she
desires, then the good is considered to be free by economic
theory.
The distinguishing characteristic of an economic good
is not that a consumer must pay money to acquire it.
notion of a free good is broader.

The

A free good is a good
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which is literally available for nothing, except the time
one must give up to enjoy it rather than some other good.
If people must drive to the country to fill their lungs with
clean air, then even though they do not deposit coins or
bills in an air-dispensing machine to purchase the clean
air, it is not a free good.

The drive to the country con

sumed gasoline and put wear and tear on the car.

The trav

elers had to give up other things they could have done in
stead.

As soon as one must give up anything to acquire a

good, its character has changed from a free to a scarce eco
nomic good.
The above analysis should reinforce the notion that
economics is the science of human action, for an object that
remains the same to the physicist or chemist has changed its
nature to the economist.

The object itself has not changed.

There may be objectively less of it, but this is not alone
what made it scarce.
is human desire.

The necessary condition for scarcity

For if there were less of a good which no

one wanted, it would not be considered scarce by economic
theory, and if there were more of a good of which everyone
wants more, it would still be considered scarce by economic
theory.

The key is human valuation.

Environmental goods are economic goods as long as they
are the object of human valuation and not freely available
to all who desire them.

The goal of some environmentalists

to provide environmental goods for free to all who desire
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them, as a sort of human birthright, can therefore be seen
to be impossible.

The very fact that environmental goods

have become the object of action by environmentalists re
moves those goods from the category of free goods and places
them in the category of economic goods which are not free.
The action the environmentalists must take to attempt to
provide the environmental goods are part of the cost of the
good.

No amount of political action can make an economic

good free.

This is true even if environmentalists establish

a scheme which coerces some individuals to subsidize envi
ronmental goods for other consumers.

The environmentalists

did not sit at home doing nothing while other humans sat at
home enjoying environmental goods, as both groups know very
well.

Therefore, as nice as it would be if environmental

goods were our birthright, they are in fact not free.
Environmental goods are the object of human action.
are scarce.

They

Environmental goods are economic goods.

Environmentalists, media journalists, politicians and
others often refer to the environment as if it were a single
indivisible good.

Aspects of the environment are interre

lated into what ecologists call the biosphere or ecosphere
and geologists call the geosphere but acting human beings
distinguish various aspects of the environment as separate
goods.

Some environmentalists may have as the goal of their

action an overall clean environment.

Yet, an

environmentalist cannot make the entire earth clean in one

5

action.

That final goal has many subcomponents that are

goals of action.

Environmentalists can instead take many

separate actions directed toward subcomponents of the
environment.

Because economics is the science of human

action, this study will treat the environment as acting
humans value it: as a set of distinguishable environmental
goods rather than one indivisible good.
Human valuation determines not only whether a good is a
free good or an economic good, but also what type of eco
nomic good it is.

The same type of physical good can have

different economic functions.

The three theoretical divi

sions of productive factors are land, labor, and capital.
Clearly environmental goods are not labor but they may be
classified as land.

Environmental goods can be enjoyed as

ends in themselves, or they can serve as means to another
goal.

In economic terms, environmental goods can also be

both consumer and capital goods.
Environmental goods that exist as they occur in nature,
without human transformation, fit the economic category of
land.

The economic category of land includes things such as

natural resources that are originally provided in nature.
Once human labor is mixed with land, and the land is put to
productive use, it becomes more difficult to clearly distin
guish whether the good is in the category of land or of cap
ital.

Poor topsoil improved through the addition of organic

material and used to grow food, for example,

is no longer in

6

the state in which it was found in nature.

An old forest

when first cut is land but with reseeding and careful har
vesting it becomes capable of a sustained yield.

The labor

of reseeding, of planning timely harvests, of forest manage
ment, all go into converting raw land into what might be
more properly characterized as a capital good.
blurry.

The line is

Clearly, the actual physical land dimensions are

still land which can be sold or rented.

Nevertheless, as

humans convert more and more of the earth's surface and
bring more resources into production, natural resources are
no longer merely land.

They become capital goods.

Consumer goods satisfy human desires directly, but they
do not have to be destroyed to be enjoyed.

Van Gogh's

"Sunflowers" can be enjoyed by throngs of gallery visitors
without being used up in the process.

Similarly, a real

landscape may provide visual pleasure without being de
stroyed in the process.
tal good.

This latter good is an environmen

Although the process of consumption does not

destroy these goods, they are still scarce because they are
not available unless one takes action to acquire them.

One

must drive to the landscape or live in it to enjoy it.

Of

course, many environmental goods do deteriorate through
consumption.
wilderness.

This is a particular problem for managers of
Restrictions on the enjoyment of wilderness

such as visitor limits, camping permits, and waiting lists
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illustrate the fact that these are indeed scarce, not free,
goods.
Environmental goods serve not only as consumer goods to
which we travel for recreation or health.

Certain aspects

of the environment take on the nature of capital goods, eco
nomic goods which are used to produce directly enjoyable
consumer goods.

Water in a river might once have been used

solely as a recreational consumer good, but now in conjunc
tion with a dam may provide the hydroelectric power to pro
duce the slide show rafters can share with their friends.
Environmental goods may be either capital or consumer
goods, but the emphasis below will be on the investment of
capital in the production of directly consumable environ
mental goods.

The image which one might have in mind as the

quintessential environmental good is a pristine wilderness.
It may therefore seem artificial to think of this as some
thing produced.
experienced.

It is rather thought of as discovered or

Further reflection, however, will reveal that

one's experience is made possible by a multitude of auxil
iary produced goods.

Merchandisers of special outdoor

clothing provide us with a measure of comfort while we are
in the wilderness.

Mosquito repellant keeps us from being

driven to distraction.

Topographic maps, compasses, and al

timeters allow us to find our way into and out of the
wilderness so that it is not the last good we consume.

The

services of guides or instructors may provide or teach us
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skills we need to survive in the wilderness.

We may have

prepared for the experience by reading books printed by
presses in ink on paper.

Photographic equipment allows us

to partially recapture the experience when we are no longer
in the wilderness

This technology involves chemicals, and

perhaps also electronics and electricity.
What we mean by wilderness as an environmental good is
clearly not to walk barefoot with thorns and stones
puncturing our feet, nude with the sun burning our skin or
rain drenching us or snow and ice making us hypothermic,
gathering herbs and berries and eating them cold, subject to
mauling by large predatory animals or to intestinal disease
from invisible bacteria in impure water.

Although one can

imagine that some people might want to experience utter
wildness, clearly this is different from what we normally
mean by wilderness as an environmental good.

We must

therefore accept the fact that production allows us to enjoy
environmental goods.
Even those who desire utter wildness must have legiti
mate ownership of the wilderness they tread.

Perhaps they

have established their discovery of fishing holes.

Perhaps

they have marked boundaries of the area which they roam.
Perhaps they have made millions on Wall Street and bought a
south sea isle.

Perhaps they are allowed to roam the area

in exchange for cataloguing species which interest nature
society members not sufficiently enamored with wilderness to
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put up with ticks and chills.

Clearly, then, environmental

goods exist within the nexus of all goods, property ex
changes, and production.
PUBLIC GOODS
Some economists propose a third type of economic good
in addition to consumer and capital goods, and environmen
talists often seem to place the environment in this category
of goods.

This type of good is called a "public good."

The definition of a public good is problematic.

Public

goods are generally held to have two characteristics.
First, nonpayers cannot be excluded from enjoying them.
Second, additional consumers enjoy the good at no additional
cost to the provider.

Private goods would have the opposite

qualities.
One problem with this definition is that many goods
which people would normally consider to be private have a
public good aspect, such as privately landscaped yards and
maintained homes.

Nicely upkept private property tends to

increase property values in the neighborhood.

Neighbors

also enjoy the beautiful landscape even though they do not
pay to maintain it.

Owners may use new technology to ex

clude nonpayers, thereby converting a public to a private
good.

Fences block other people's view, for example.

A

second major problem with the definition is that costs are
subjective, so that only the provider can determine whether
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the costs of providing the good to an additional consumer
are zero.
In addition to these problems of unambiguous classifi
cation, thorough examination of the historical record indi
cates that many goods now assumed to be public goods were
privately provided in the past. Ronald Coase's research on
lighthouses demonstrated that they were not the paradigmatic
public good that economists often assume them to be (1974).
Despite the problems with the notion of a public good,
the common assumption is that public goods must be publicly
provided.

The argument is that if there are free riders, a

private supplier will not be willing to provide the good,
and therefore government must do so.

Those interested in

the provision of environmental goods may subscribe to this
view.

Environmental goods such as clean air and water may

seem to be public goods which must be publicly provided.
Given the historical evidence and logical problems with the
definition of a public good, the classification of
environmental goods as public goods will not be further en
tertained here.

Rather, the remaining focus is to emphasize

the private provision of environmental goods.

The notion of

a public good is unnecessary both for the theoretical out
line of Austrian economic theory and for the application of
that theory to environmental goods.

For an examination of

the concept of a "public good," see (Hoppe 1989b).
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Economic theory is as applicable to environmental goods
as it is to any other scarce, valuable object of human ac
tion.

To the extent that humans choose environmental goods

as goals, or use environmental goods as means to other
goals, economic theory is applicable to environmental goods.
Economic theory is a useful tool for understanding how
environmental goods can be provided to those who desire
them.
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CHAPTER II

AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC THEORY
This section presents the essential principles of
Austrian economic theory which will then be applied to the
provision of environmental goods.

Although there are cur

rently few proponents of Austrian economics relative to more
popular theories such as Keynesianism and monetarism, the
popularity of a theory has no necessary positive correlation
with its truth.

At times in the history of economic

thought, the precursors of Austrian economics were the
mainstream.

In the field of resource economics, Austrian

theory has not diverged from its roots, but more mainstream
theories have become encrusted with auxiliary notions such
as public goods, externalities, and social cost-benefit
analysis.
METHODOLOGY
Austrian economic theory provides a lean cut through
the meat of the discipline, a chunk Ockham himself could
have sliced off.

Like the best cuts, it is high on nutri

tion and low on fat.

An Austrian approach to environmental

economics recognizes that because economics is a social sci
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ence, its methodology is different from that of the physical
sciences.

Because of the implications of its explicit and

highly refined methodology, Austrian economics can make a
unique contribution to environmental economics, and it ar
rives at its conclusions with a minimum of auxiliary con
structions.

It is, in a word, efficient.

Humans have no special insight into causal factors in
the physical or biological sciences, and therefore must de
velop and test causal explanatory principles from repeated
observations.

The methods of the physical sciences are in

appropriate and unnecessary for investigations of human phe
nomena because humans know through introspection the cause
of human action.

Investigations of human action are there

fore fundamentally different from our studies of nonhuman
events.
The method appropriate to the social sciences is deduc
tion from the synthetic a priori statement,

"humans act."

We cannot successfully doubt the statement, because to make
the statement,

"Humans do not act," is itself a human act.

Thus, the fact of human action is indubitable for us.
is not a sterile fact.

This

This statement implies a wealth of

conclusions about human action in the world.
provides a synthetic a priori methodology:

Human action

it yields

information about the world yet is fundamentally true.
"Praxeology" is the term coined by the Austrian
economist, Ludwig von Mises, to describe the body of knowl
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edge deduced from the fundamental axiom of human action.
Every discipline must begin somewhere; the praxeological
method begins with the self-evident proposition, "humans
act."

From this and some auxiliary assumptions which take

into account the nature of our physical world and human
nature as we know it, Austrian economics has reconstructed
everything from marginal value theory to business cycle
theory.
The conclusions of Austrian economics are derived from
an indubitable axiom by means of logical inference.
Therefore, empirical tests of economic theory are unneces
sary.

Reason is a sufficient tool for deduction.

Austrian

economics is accessible to all reasoning intellects.

An

Austrian approach to environmental economics is an applica
tion of this deductive methodology.

An Austrian approach to

environmental economics, therefore, is deductive.

Barring

mistakes in logic, the conclusions of Austrian economic
theory are undeniable.
Conclusions that have the character of undeniable laws
should not be offensive to environmentalists.
sciences are painstakingly empirical.
on induction from observation.

Environmental

Their laws are based

Though the methodologies of

economics and the environmental sciences are different, both
disciplines have scientific laws which cannot be violated
with impunity.

A certain number of fertile individuals must

exist to maintain a species.

If the number drops below
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this, the species becomes extinct.

Barring miracles of

molecular genetics, no amount of intervention can revive the
species.

In economics, expansion of credit induces mal-

investments which cannot be sustained by concurrent consumer
savings.

No amount of inflation (increases in the supply of

money) can avert the down side of the business cycle, and in
fact further extensions of credit or inflation worsens it.
These are both scientific laws, though one is inductively
and the other deductively discovered.
Humans have no special insight into the causal factors
in the physical or biological sciences, and therefore must
develop and test causal explanatory principles by repeated
observation.

This methodological difference between the

social and physical sciences requires a methodological dual
ism.

It is inappropriate and unnecessary to use the methods

of the physical sciences to investigate human phenomena.
Ludwig von Mises emphasized these differences in several of
his books (1966,1976,1978,1985).
The empiricist positivist paradigm of science denies
the existence of synthetic a priori statements.

Either a

statement is undeniably true but devoid of any empirical in
formation, or the statement is not undeniably true but pro
vides such information.

To the positivist, all statements

in the human social sciences must be empirically testable,
not undeniably true.

Statements which pass tests are still

not undeniably true, but are tentatively accepted.

Hans-
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Hermann Hoppe has provided a succinct statement of the dif
ferences between the two positions and a refutation of the
positivist approach to the science of human action (1983).
The different method of the social sciences allows informa
tion to be discovered through deduction.

The implications

of the axiom of human action are developed below.

IMPLICATIONS OF ACTION
The axiom of action is "Humans act."

This means that

we pursue ends different from what might occur if we did not
act.

If we expect to be satisfied by the result of our in

action, we do not act overtly.

This is also an act, how

ever, because we choose to continue in the previous action.
Our actions are motivated by our desire to achieve our cho
sen ends.

Economics cannot deduce the particular motiva

tions for human action.
psychology.

That is properly the domain of

Economics can say that humans act to achieve

ends which they prefer, rather than ends which would occur
if they did not act.

We use the means at our disposal,

ini

tially our bodies but also any other means we have acquired,
to achieve our goals.
Our ends have subjective value to us as individual ac
tors.

The fact that we pursue an end means that it is of

value to us.

"Subjective" as used here does not connote

something untrue or less reliable than something objective.
"Subjective" means simply "from the acting individual's per-
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spective."

Because ends are pursued by individuals, no

other sense of value except the subjective exists in human
action.
There are a wide range of ends which an individual can
pursue but only a limited amount of means to achieve them.
Even if physical means were abundant, as long as time passes
and we have only one body, we can only pursue one end at a
time.

We must, therefore, rank our ends.

essarily an explicitly conscious process.

This is not nec
What must be

true, however, is that any given action aims at the highest
ranked end at that time.
From the means at our disposal we use those which we
expect will help us achieve our highest ranked end.

Our

means are ranked in value according to the ends we expect
them to achieve.
Ranking may conjure notions of arithmetical comparison
but it would be incorrect to attempt such an application.
While ends and means may be ordered from most to least val
ued, all that can be said about any two ends or means is
that one is preferred to the other.

We cannot say by how

much one is preferred to the other.

Value is subjective.

There is no objective unit of value by which to compare
ends.

Ends are ordinally, not cardinally, ranked.

If there

is no cardinal ranking for an individual because there is no
unit for comparison, then there is also no unit for
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interpersonal comparisons of value, or for adding the values
of different people.
Not only is there no unit of value, but the value at
tached to physically identical units of means varies with
the number of units available to us.

The value of units of

means varies with the ends which they are used to achieve.
For example, if we have 30 gallons of water, we will use the
first few gallons for drinking, the next few for cooking,
the next few perhaps for our pets or for bathing, and the
last for our landscape unless we are growing edible food, in
which case water for our vegetable plants might be more
highly valued than water for boiling food.
If we have a number of units which can achieve several
different ends, then we will use the first unit or units to
achieve our most highly (subjectively) valued end.

The next

unit or units will be used to achieve the next lower valued
end which they can achieve.

The value of the first used

units is higher than the value of those used later.

As we

add to our stock of a good, each additional unit can be used
to satisfy lower valued ends.

Similarly, as we lose units

of our good, each remaining unit must be used to serve more
highly valued ends.

Therefore, the value of the additional

or marginal unit of a good varies inversely to the number of
units of the good we possess.
marginal value.

This is the theory of
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The theory of marginal value solves the paradox of
value.

The paradox of value is that goods less useful for

human life, such as gold or diamonds, fetch a higher price,
or are more highly valued, than goods absolutely essential
for life, such as bread or water.

The paradox occurs if we

think of the entire supply of a good rather than marginal
units of it and their relative scarcity.

If we have a lot

of gallons of water available, the marginal gallon will have
a low value.

Because diamonds are scarce, we have only

enough of them to satisfy our highest valued end of
aesthetic pleasure.

If, however, we were faced with a very

small stock of gallons of water, our end of life maintenance
would rank higher than our end of aesthetic pleasure, and
the gallons of water would be more highly valued than the
diamond.

In fact, a thirsty person in the desert might

willingly give up a diamond in exchange for a gallon of
water.
When we pursue one end with a unit of a good, we cannot
pursue another end to which that unit could be put.

The

next most highly ranked end to which we could have put the
unit which we are now using for our highest ranked end is
the cost of our action.
up.

It is the alternative we have given

If we only have enough water for drinking or for water

ing our vegetables, and we use the water for drinking, then
watering our vegetables is the cost of our action.

It is
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the most highly ranked alternative end which we must forgo
because of the end we have chosen.
Prices are exchange ratios between goods.

If we were

thirsty in the desert and gave up a diamond for a gallon of
water, the price of a gallon of water would be a diamond,
and the price of a diamond would be a gallon of water.
Prices are simply the exchange ratios between goods.
do not measure the value of goods.

Prices

Values are subjective.

Exchanges of goods are objective, but they are a higher or
der phenomenon which results from-the different subjective
valuations of the individuals who make the exchange.

Higher

order phenomena emerge from more fundamental phenomena.
Individual ranking of ends, a more fundamental event, must
occur before that individual can decide what to give up in
exchange to another individual.

Exchange ratios, or prices,

are thus higher order phenomena that occur when more than
one individual acts.
For an exchange to occur, the parties to the exchange
must have opposite valuations: one must value a gallon of
water more highly than a diamond, and the other must value a
diamond more highly than a gallon of water, in order for an
exchange to take place.
coincidence of wants.

This is called double and reverse
If both valued a gallon of water more

highly than a diamond, the person who had the gallon of wa
ter would not give it up for a diamond, and the person with
the diamond would remain thirsty.

Prices, therefore, do not
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"measure" anything objective about the value of the goods
exchanged.

The goods have unequal and oppositely ranked

subjective value to the parties in the exchange.
merely reflect the objective fact of the exchange.

Prices
Thus, if

an exchange takes place, there has been what is called a
"double and reverse coincidence of wants" and both parties
to the exchange have benefitted.
Every exchange benefits both parties to the exchange.
Both parties exchange something they value less for some
thing they value more.

If one thirsty person in a desert

gives up a diamond for a gallon of water, this is because
that diamond is worth less to him than the gallon of water.
And the other person who gave up the gallon of water for a
diamond also did so because he valued the gallon of water
less than the diamond.

Both parties get what they desire

from the exchange.
Some exchanges take place not at the same moment but
over time.

For example, if

gallon of water in

the thirsty person obtained a

exchange for ten diamonds when the par- ,

ties reach his mine, an exchange through time has taken
place.

A present good, the gallon of water, has been ex

changed for a future good, ten diamonds.

The price of a

gallon of water is

either a diamond now or ten diamonds when

the parties get to

the mine because aside from the risk that

the contract will not be fulfilled, we all prefer, to
greater or lesser degree, the same amount of a good now to
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that same amount in the future.

This is the phenomenon of

time preference.
Interest is a phenomenon of time preference.

Interest

is merely the premium paid over a current exchange price in
order to fulfill the exchange in the future.

The water

provider requires something commensurate to what he could
have done with the diamond if he had had it during the time
between the contracted exchange and when the other party to
the exchange fulfills his contract.

Clearly interest is not

a function of money, because contracts for future payments
may be in kind, as is this water for diamonds example.
Austrian economists recognize that interest is purely a
time-preference phenomenon, not a payment to capital paral
lel to wage payments for labor and rent payments to land.
Capital goods are factors of production.

They are

higher order goods which are used to produce the lowest or
der of goods, consumer goods.

From the perspective of act

ing individuals, capital goods are useful only because they
produce goods which individuals can consume directly.
Individuals receive no satisfaction from the existence of
capital goods per se.

Individuals do not therefore invest

in or produce capital goods unless they expect that the in
vestment will yield greater quantitative or qualitative sat
isfaction than the individuals currently enjoy from the ex
isting array of consumer goods.

At any given time, we

choose to satisfy our highest valued ends with the means at
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our disposal.

If we perceive a way to use the same means to

provide even more for ourselves at a later date than we
could if we did not change our way of doing things, we may
choose to invest in the new process.

This investment in

volves saving or abstaining from immediate consumption of
some of our stock of existing consumer goods so that we can
provide for our needs during the period of production, the
time before the goods produced by the new, more productive
methods are available.

Capital goods are means of produc

tion produced as a result of saving.
One feature of capital goods must be emphasized.
Capital is not merely a monetary phenomenon.

Capital con

sists in real goods that are subject to fires, rust, earth
quakes, and other natural contingencies.

Capital is not

merely electronic registers of invested sums of money.
Capital goods are goods that are used to produce consumer
goods.

Capital goods may fetch a certain price in the mar

ket and that price may be used to determine whether one
wishes to retain that capital good in the line of production
for which it is currently being used.

The price which one

might obtain for a capital good must not be confused with
the capital good itself.

Clearly goods can be used to pro

duce more directly consumable goods in the absence of money
or sophisticated accounting systems.

When aboriginal peo

ples fashioned fishing nets, they invested time and energy
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in capital goods that would eventually produce edible con
sumer goods.
Austrian economists focus on capital as real goods.
Capital per se is a concept which can be expressed in mone
tary terms to represent and compare the values of capital
goods.

This focus on the goods nature of capital allowed

the Austrians to avoid facile assumptions such as Frank
Knight's that capital is a permanent fund that renews itself
automatically in the process of production.

Friedrich Hayek

argued against Knight's position in "The Mythology of
Capital"

(1936).

In "The Maintenance of Capital" Hayek de

tailed the difficulties of determining how to replace capi
tal goods so that capital, or the income which one derives
from the products it yields, remains constant (1939,83-134).
Fritz Machlup demonstrated just how difficult it is to main
tain capital goods in "The Consumption of Capital in
Austria"

(1935) .

Capital value losses of corporations in

Austria between 1913 and 1930 were as high as ninety percent
and averaged sixty-one percent.
Once people have sacrificed consumption to invest in
new, more productive techniques, they want to maintain those
capital investments and their greater productivity.

People

need some means to determine whether they are maintaining
capital goods.
accounting.

This is the role of money prices and cost

As long as there are markets and therefore

money prices for capital goods, owners of capital can
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determine what they could get for it if they were to sell
it.

Bids they might receive for it would indicate how other

producers evaluate its quality or remaining years of
productivity.

This provides them with a measure of capital

maintenance or depreciation.
To determine whether they can afford to maintain their
capital, owners can compare the total of prices

paid for

various inputs to their line of production, with the total
revenue received for selling the product at the market
price.

If revenue was greater than input, they made a

profit,

if not, they incurred a loss.

If they did not yet

count capital maintenance as an input expense, they can see
that only if they make a profit can they maintain capital.
Without prices to determine profit and loss, capital goods
owners cannot perform the accounting necessary to determine
whether they can maintain their capital.

Mises succinctly

describes the role of profit and loss in "Profit and Loss"
in Planning for Freedom (1952,108-150).

Capital maintenance

is critical, because without it, investments are wasted.
The role of the capitalist-entrepreneur is to invest
capital in lines of production that will be more profitable
to the entrepreneur because they better satisfy the demands
of consumers.

Capitalist-entrepreneurs risk their own sav

ings (or assume responsibility for risking the savings of
others) as they invest capital in lines of production which
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they expect will produce higher-valued products than the
products currently produced by the factors.
Ludwig von Mises made clear that the capitalist-entrepreneur is a theoretical construct.

In real life, that

role or economic function may be split between two people or
combined with other roles.

For example, many small in

vestors are capitalists because they own shares of stock of
corporations.

On the other hand, some entrepreneurs are

also managers of the business in which they've invested cap
ital.

Other managers are employees of the firm in which

they work but have made no capital investment in it.
Finally, because uncertainty pervades all our actions, we
are all entrepreneurs or risk-takers (1966,251-253).
The capitalist-entrepreneur drives the market to sat
isfy consumer demand.

Those who fail to satisfy demand, who

incorrectly anticipate demand, register losses in their ac
counts .

These losses serve as both feedback and control.

They let entrepreneurs know that they are not satisfying
consumer demand.

They also prevent entrepreneurs from con

tinuing to waste capital if they are not satisfying demand.
The entrepreneur's capital will deteriorate to nothing if he
ignores the feedback of his losses; thus he will be ef
fectively prohibited from incurring additional losses.
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THE NATURAL THEORY OF PROPERTY
Capitalist-entrepreneurs must acquire the capital they
risk.

To buy the goods produced by capitalist en

trepreneurs, consumers must have income.

The natural theory

of property developed by Hans-Hermann Hoppe demonstrates
that private property rights underlie income and wealth.
Hoppe develops his natural theory of property through
an analysis of argumentation.

Argumentation is the type of

human action we perform when we make claims about property
rights.

Hoppe presents his argument in chapter seven of A

Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, in particular on pages
132-134

(1989).

Although Hoppe calls his theory a "natural"

theory of property, he does not develop it from the tradi
tional natural rights perspective, an analysis of the
essence of human nature.

Murray Rothbard developed the im

plications of natural rights or natural law theory for po
litical economy in his The Ethics of Liberty through a fa
vorite tool of economists, Crusoe analysis (1982b,29-37).
Thus any individual must recognize certain things about his
nature (his consciousness, rationality, and ability to act)
which lead to the recognition of natural rights and property
rights.

Both theories support private property rights.

Hoppe's theory is an expansion of and logical foundation for
what Rothbard describes as evident to individuals by the
very fact of their action.

Hoppe discusses the differences

between his and Rothbard's ethical theories in "From the
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Economics of Laissez Faire to The Ethics of Libertarianism"
(Block 1988,60-61,66-67).

The article also contains a con

cise presentation of Hoppe's argument for the natural theory
of property (62-66).
According to the natural theory of property, the first
point that must be recognized is that we have property
rights in our own bodies.
to do anything.

If we did not, we would be unable

Others would have the right to interfere

with our bodies.

Hoppe develops the point by arguing that

no one could argue that we do not have property rights in
our own bodies without thereby performing a self-contradic
tory act.

To argue at all implies that one does have a

right to one's own body, to engage in argumentation.

The

first thing to which an individual has a right, therefore,
is his or her own body.
Our bodies allow us to acquire property through home
steading, production, and exchange.
explore our environment.

With our bodies, we can

We can labor to demarcate property

unclaimed by others and claim it for ourselves.
homesteading.

This is

Hoppe's natural theory of property can be

considered as providing a logical foundation for more
traditional homesteading theories of property rights such as
that of John Locke in Two Treatises of Government (1970).
We can mix our labor with land to produce goods, and we can
exchange the goods we produce with the goods that other peo
ple produce.

Murray Rothbard has emphasized that every ex
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change of goods is actually also an exchange of property ti
tles to those goods.

He makes this point in Man. Economy,

and State (1970,78-80) and in The Ethics of Liberty
(1982b,36).
A thief takes a good coercively.

He does not receive

legitimate title to it because he obtained it coercively.
Although the thief has physical possession of the good, he
does not have title to it because he did not obtain the good
in a voluntary exchange.

Physical violation of the property

of others is also wrong.

To argue that such violence could

be permissible is clearly not a moral principle which can be
universalized.

If there were such a principle, then we

could all destroy each other's property and bodies, and we
would all be dead.
The requirement that ethical principles be applicable
to everyone or to all cases to which they apply is well es
tablished.

Thus Kant's categorical imperative satisfies the

principle of universalization.

"Act only according to that

maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law" (1959,39).

The principle of uni

versalization is also expressed in the familiar "Golden
Rule," "And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye
also to them likewise." [Luke 6:31]
We would also all be dead if we were to try to univer
salize the principle that violations of the value of prop
erty, and not physical violations of property alone, are
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wrong.

For value is subjective, and it would be impossible

to determine whether any contemplated action might decrease
the value of some property in its owner's estimation.

Even

if we asked the owner, he might lie or be mistaken about
what his future valuation would be, so this principle would
be unworkable.

To argue for property rights to values also

presupposes the right to the physical integrity of one's
body, so that the argumentative performance actually estab
lishes property rights to physical things, not values.
Hoppe argues this point in "From the Economics of LaissezFaire to the Ethics of Libertarianism"

(1988,69-71) and

in

"The Ethical Justification of Capitalism and Why Socialism
is Morally Indefensible," chapter 7 of his A Theory of
Socialism and Capitalism (1989a,139-141).

Hoppe argues that

attempts to establish property rights to values would
actually lead to an absurd and ironical result:

"Thus, if

one wanted property values to be protected, one would have
to allow physical aggression against people."

(1989a,141)

The natural theory of property leads to a system of property
rights which guarantees the physical integrity, but not the
value, of property, and which guarantees the right of
defense against physical violations of property.
Because property rights derive from individuals' rights
to their bodies and to their homesteaded, produced, and vol
untarily exchanged goods,

it is clear that legitimate owner

ship must be a private phenomenon.

Groups of individuals
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may agree to own shares of a productive enterprise, but
property titles are still held by individuals.

To attempt

to abolish private ownership involves one in a self
contradictory performance.

If attempted in the means of

production, abolishment of private ownership leads to chaos
and political battles.
Chaos occurs when there are no longer prices for fac
tors of production to help one determine whether capital is
being maintained.

Because one does not own the capital and

has not risked one's own wealth in production, loss controls
do not work.

Chaos occurs because capital is used to pro

duce goods which consumers desire less than other possible
goods, yet there is no effective feedback and control to in
dicate and correct this problem.
In Planned Chaos (reprinted as the epilogue to his
book, Socialism], Ludwig von Mises demonstrates that planned
economies lead to chaos and decreased wealth rather than to
more efficient production and increased wealth as their pro
ponents claim.

Thus, chaos is not generated by free prop

erty exchanges, but rather by attempts to plan them.
"...the methods of interventionism are doomed to failure.
This means: the interventionist measures must needs [sic]
result in conditions which from the point of view of their
own advocates are more unsatisfactory than the previous
state of affairs they were designed to alter.
cies are therefore contrary to purpose"

These poli

(1981,486).
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Mises also makes clear that free-market economies are
not without plans: individuals acting in the economy have
their own plans of action.

Therefore the choice is not

between the chaos of an unplanned economy and the order of a
planned economy, but between the order of an economy in
which individuals can act according to their own plans, and
the chaos and political conflict of an economy in which
planners force their plans on others.

"Whatever people do

in the market economy," Mises wrote, "is the execution of
their own plans.
planning.

In this sense every human action means

What those calling themselves planners advocate

is not the substitution of planned action for letting things
go.

It is the substitution of the planner's own plan for

the plans of his fellow-men"

(1981,493).

When there is not private ownership of the means of
production, production decisions are made through political
rather than economic means.

Political decisions about the

means of production lead to political conflict.
vate ownership,

Under pri

individuals can attempt to satisfy them

selves through actions they take with their own goods.
owner expects to benefit from exchange.

Each

Political

decisions, on the other hand, cannot involve mutual
exchange.

The political means of decision making can never

be economic, because the economic means involves free will
and uncoerced action.

The political means involves coercion

of some to the plans of others.

Political decisions are
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made about things unowned by anyone or about things owned by
others.

Political decisions always create winners and

losers.

These groups conflict over what to do with the

means of production.

Within the framework of the natural

theory of property and Austrian economic theory, therefore,
political economic decisions are unjustifiable and
unworkable.
In The State. Franz Oppenheimer distinguishes between
the only two ways in which people can acquire the goods they
desire:

"These are work and robbery, one's own labor and the

forcible appropriation of the labor of others."

Oppenheimer

calls the former "the 'economic means' for the satisfaction
of needs," while the latter he calls the "political means."
(1975,12)

Mises makes a similar distinction, that between

contractual and hegemonic relationships:

"Human civilization

. . . is preponderantly a product of contractual relations."
but "The state as an apparatus of compulsion and coercion is
by necessity a hegemonic organization."

(1966,196).

Mises

unfortunately confuses the distinction between these two re
lationships by labeling them both "cooperation," when it
clearly is stretching that term to apply it to situations in
which one's only choice is to obey or die (or suffer some
other damage).
Rothbard makes the difference between the two means of
obtaining goods clear with his division of types of
interpersonal action into two categories:

"invasive" or
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violent, which includes assault, murder, robbery, slavery
and war, and "noninvasive" or nonviolent, which includes
voluntary exchange and gifts (1970,67-80).

Rothbard also

categorizes and develops the implications for wealth of
various types of political intervention in the market.
"Coercive intervention,

. . . , signifies per se that the

individual or individuals coerced would not have done what
they are now doing were it not for the intervention.

The

individual who is coerced into . . . making or not making an
exchange with the intervener or with someone else is having
his actions changed by a threat of violence.

The coerced

individual loses in utility as a result of the intervention,
for his action has been changed by its impact.
intervention,
(1977a,13)

Any

. . , causes the subjects to lose in utility."

For the same argument made in Rothbard's concise

and thorough development of Austrian welfare theory, see
"Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics"
(1977b,28-30).

Hoppe calls the two types of interpersonal

action "contractual exchange" and "aggression"
12 ).

(1989a,11-
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CHAPTER III

AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC THEORY APPLIED
TO ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
Environmental goods are subject to the same laws of
property and economics as are all other goods.

They must be

privately owned, privately produced, and voluntarily ex
changed.

They are subjectively valued.

They compete with

other goods in the market to satisfy consumer demand.
Capitalist-entrepreneurs produce environmental goods when
they expect the prices consumers will pay for the goods to
exceed the cost of producing them.
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
The first implication of Austrian economic theory for
environmental economics is that environmental goods must be
privately owned.

If environmental goods are not privately

owned, there are no markets, no prices derived from exchange
of goods, and capital and cost accounting for the production
of environmental goods is impossible.
production and political conflict.

This leads to chaotic

If the means of produc

tion of environmental goods are not privately owned, then
even if one recognizes that physical deterioration has oc
curred, one cannot know what that physical deterioration
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represents.

One cannot know how expensive it will be to re

place the capital good or resource, or whether in fact one
ought to use the good in some other line of production be
cause this line of production does not cover the cost of re
placement of deteriorating means of production.
If environmental goods cannot be owned by consumers,
there cannot be effective consumer demand for them.
Consumers will not spend money to obtain them.

As a result,

there will be no prices to indicate to capitalist-en
trepreneurs that they might be able to make a profit by pro
viding the goods to consumers.

If capitalist-entrepreneurs

cannot expect to make a profit, then they will not supply
environmental goods to consumers.
Thoroughgoing private ownership is necessary for the
production of environmental goods.

Consumers must be able

to own environmental goods, and producers must be able to
own the means to produce environmental goods.
A tragic chapter in the history of attempts to provide
environmental goods through political means occurred in the
early days of what later became the Sierra Club.

John Muir

and other outdoor enthusiasts wanted to preserve the lovely
Hetch-Hetchy Valley, a smaller sister to Yosemite.

Instead

of raising the money to buy it outright, they tried to get
political support from the public, several successive
Secretaries of the Interior, the nation's chief forester,
Gifford Pinchot, congressional representatives and presi-
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dents Cleveland, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson.

These politi

cal representatives and officials also listened to groups
associated with the city of San Francisco, who had opposite
ideas about what to do with the valley.

The city won the

twenty-three year political battle and the valley eventually
became a reservoir.
The trustworthiness of political allies was
spectacularly embodied in Roosevelt.

Muir treated him to a

camping trip in Hetch-Hetchy, about which Roosevelt en
thused,

"we lay in the open, the enormous cinnamon-colored

trunks rising about us like the columns of a vaster and more
beautiful cathedral than was ever conceived by any human ar
chitect."

But Roosevelt's later actions allowed human ar

chitects to drown those grand living columns below 175 feet
of dammed reservoir water.

His explanation was, "It was

just one of those cases where I was extremely doubtful but
finally I came to the conclusion that I ought to stand by
Garfield and Pinchot's judgment in the matter."
1985,125,142).

(Fox

For more on the history of the Sierra Club

and Yosemite, see John Muir and the Sierra Club: The Battle
for Yosemite (Jones 1965).

For more on the environmental

movement in that era, see Hays, Conservation and the Gospel
of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement.
1920 (1959).

1890-
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CAPITALIST-ENTREPRENEURS, INTEREST RATES, AND INVESTMENT
Consumer demand for environmental goods ultimately de
termines whether capitalist-entrepreneurs will be successful
or not, but the role of the capitalist-entrepreneur as a
producer of environmental goods is crucial.

Capital goods

produce more or higher quality environmental goods that con
sumers demand.
The environmental entrepreneur invests in capital goods
which will produce environmental goods.

He guesses that

capital goods are undervalued in their current line of pro
duction.

He hopes to buy them at low prices now and to

later sell finished goods to consumers at prices which will
pay both for the factors of production and interest.
Interest must be paid back to people who relinquished their
savings, a current good, in exchange for a future good.
Assuming the entrepreneur correctly guessed future consumer
demand, he will reap profits.

As the market for a new envi

ronmental good develops, however, competitors will enter and
bid up factor prices, while at the same time the increased
supply of the good on the market will decrease its price.
Profits will tend to disappear as the market tends toward
equilibrium, but given change in the world and in individual
action, new profit-making opportunities for entrepreneurs
will develop.

What would remain even if a market were to

reach equilibrium is a rate of interest, the premium paid
for exchanges paid in time.
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The role of interest rates has been examined by some
resource economists.

These resource economists emphasized

that a decision about whether to conserve or to exploit a
natural resource takes different time periods into consider
ation.

Interest rates enter investment decisions because

they reflect people's time preferences.
While the emphasis here is on the production of envi
ronmental goods, earlier environmental economists analyzed
conservation of natural resources.

This difference in focus

does not necessarily lead to a different analysis.

For ex

ample, Scott Gordon observes that "the conservation ques
tion, when correctly conceived, becomes simply an aspect or
application of the traditional theory of capital"
(1958,112).

Anthony Scott emphasizes capital investment in

Natural Resources; The Economics of Conservation (1973).
"The exploitation of natural resources is merely a special
case of the using up of any productive asset; and the pro
longation of their use is governed by the same general prin
ciples as govern the depreciation and maintenance of ma 
chines and buildings.

. . . Conservation of resources is . .

. analytically analogous to investment in capital goods;"
(1973,vii)
Scott's definition of conservation places it in an in
vestment context.

According to Scott,

"conservation . . .

seeks to increase the potential future rates of use of one
or more natural resources above what they would be in the
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absence of such policy, by current investment of the social
income"

(1973,30).

Of particular interest here is Scott's examination of
conservationist arguments that the "social" interest rate is
different from that faced by resource owners.

Scott cites

Pigou's description of market interest rates as "irrational"
because they give too much preference to the present, and
too little preference to the future.

Pigou wrote

The attitude towards investment of private individuals,
and equally of their agents,-is affected by the fact
that many persons prefer present satisfactions to fu
ture satisfactions of equal intensity, even when the
occurrence of the latter is certain.
That preference
is non-rational of two equal satisfactions.
The nearer
is desired more keenly beforehand simply because it is
nearer.
But, of course, being equal, the two satisfac
tions, viewed sub-specia eternitis are equally desir
able. An arrangement which depends on a non-rational
preference for the present over the future inevitably
reduces investment below what, in the interest of eco
nomic welfare as a whole, it "ought" to be (Scott
1973:113).
What a pity for posterity that Pigou did not pass on
his ability to escape the temporal limitations of mortal
life and mutate into a glorious new species,
ris!"

"homo atempo-

The fact is that for the rest of humanity, time is a

reality and the future is uncertain.
space and time for us.

Events are situated in

No two events with the same spatial

attribute can be identical if their temporal attribute is
different.
Pigou's slip into physiological interpretations of hu
man action may have led him astray.

Psychophysiological de
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terminations of equal satisfaction by third parties are not
the issue.

While it may be interesting to try to determine

how psychological states of satisfaction are related to var
ious physiological events, this is not necessary for eco
nomic analysis.

The economic issue is human action, of

choosing now to exchange something we value less for some
thing we value more.

The good we value more now may be a

contract to receive more goods in the future.

On the other

hand, we may now value present goods more highly than the
obligation to repay more goods in the future.

It is the

fact that individual rates of time preference differ that
makes market transactions through time possible at all.

For

a simple explanation and graph of how individuals1 varying
rates of time preference give rise to a market interest
rate, see (Rothbard 1970,350-360).
Were Pigou to succeed in shifting everyone's time pref
erence so that we would all be willing to give up present
goods for equal numbers of future goods, there would be no
point in investment.

The whole point of saving and invest

ment is to increase the quantities (or quality) of future
goods.

Given scarcity, we always attempt to produce as much

as we can the shortest way we can.

If we expect a longer

process to be more productive, we may invest in it.

But we

certainly will not invest in a more lengthy process that we
expect to be equally or less productive.
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Pigou proceeds, in this quote from his 1937 book,
Socialism versus Capitalism, to reveal a preference for so
cial experimentation rather than theoretical rigor.
It may be, no doubt, that a central planning authority
would make less provision for investment than would be
made through the private action of individuals in a
similarly placed capitalist society.
But the Russian
experiment suggests that it is likely to make more pro
vision.
There is certainly no ground for asserting a
priori that in this field, socialist central planning
will produce situations less favourable to general
well-being than capitalism would do (Scott 1973,113).
Ludwig von Mises provided the ground for the a priori
assertion in Socialism (1981).

Socialist central planning

must lead to waste and reduced standards of living because
if there is no private ownership and thus no market prices
for factors of production, there can be no profit and loss
accounting, and no way to ascertain whether capital is being
used in ways that people desire.

But of course the goal of

social planners is not to give people what they desire, but
to impose the planners' desires upon the people.
The only acceptable meaning of a "social" interest rate
from the Austrian perspective is that interest rate that
arises on the free market.

Ludwig von Mises defined society

as "concerted action, cooperation," and emphasized that
society has no existence other than in individual action
(1966,143).

Because society is only the individuals that

act in it, nothing more, "its" interest rate must be theirs.
This is not what conservationist planners believe.
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The conservationist planning argument is that the mar
ket interest rate is higher than the "social" interest rate.
Stated in terms of time preference,

individuals' rates of

time preference are higher than "society's."

Individuals

want more goods now than "society" wants now.
ern terminology,

In more mod

"transgenerational considerations" require

that current generations postpone consumption and leave more
for future generations.
What would this lead to?

Every successive generation

becomes the present generation, the one who, from the per
spective of "society," wants too much now.
be postponed forever?

Must consumption

Let us suppose that the current gen

eration becomes convinced of the rectitude of postponement.
How much should it postpone?
all consumption?

What if it decides to postpone

Then this generation would die before it

creates the next generation.

But then the next generation

would have no "say" in "society," so postponement for the
sake of the next generation could not have been correct.

To

these reductions to absurdity, an advocate of a "social"
rate could only respond that there is some practical stop
ping point before all consumption is terminated.

But only

individuals know for themselves what that point is.
Scott faults Pigou and others for not justifying their
claims with an ethical argument, but even though he criti
cizes them, he grants them far too much.

Because Scott does

not use all the economic tools the Austrian analysis pro-
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vides, he is forced into resignation.

"If society does

place this duty upon itself, the economist per se cannot
protest." (1973,118).
In addition to the protests above, one can examine what
would happen if, as the "social" planners advocate, interest
rates were artificially lowered below their market rates.
This would lead directly to capital malinvestments.

Where

would the savings come from, if the market (actual) rate is
higher than the "social"

(planned) rate?

If individuals are

not to be actually coerced into giving up their goods, the
likely means of creating a lower interest rate is through
fractional reserve bank credit.

Funds eagerly sought at the

low rate would not represent real savings capable of being
used to purchase goods in the future when the capital goods
eventually produce products.

The investments would have

been malinvestments. Real capital goods would have been
wasted.

This is the essence of Austrian business cycle

theory.

This attempt to realize the "social" interest rate

in the real economy would not lead to enhanced provision for
future generations.

It would lead directly to reduced

welfare in the future.

Scott recognizes some of these

problems and highlights the effects of artificially low
interest rates on natural resources and future wealth.
A reduced rate of time preference would not assure the
conservationist of resource preservation. . . . ex
pansion of investments at the expense of consumption
might well result in an increased derived demand for
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natural resources, which might overwhelm the new inten
tions of stock-resource owners to hold their stocks for
longer periods,. . .. Further, it is necessary to con
sider the immediate consequences of a lower rate on the
economy (a) in being inflationary, and (b) in deranging
the capitalistic nature of production.
It seems nec
essary, therefore, to reject the social rate of time
preference as a rationalization for a lower rate of in
terest. . . . It follows . . . that the conservationist
who urges us to "make greater provision for the future"
is in fact urging a lesser provision for poster
ity (1973 ,123) .
It is important to emphasize capital in the production
of environmental goods because capital is the means of fur
ther production and improvements in production to satisfy
consumer demand.

For example, backpackers may choose to

carry light freeze-dried food on the trail to allow them to
remain in the wilderness longer with the same amount of
weight devoted to food.

Freeze-drying technology removes

the heavy water content of foods so that they are light on
the trail.
nearby.

They can be rehydrated in camp with water found

Of course, ascetics with discriminating palates may

choose to accustom their stomachs to decreased food intake,
so that they can enjoy smaller portions of real meals on the
trail.

What might be derided as an abomination by purists

will continue to be produced for other backpackers or ca
noeists as long as they demand it.

Capitalist-entrepreneurs

will derive income from the consumers who do purchase
freeze-dried food.
Capital must be invested to produce environmental
goods.

At any given time, however, the stock of capital

goods is limited.

Many lines of production compete for cap-
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ital goods or for individuals' savings to purchase them.
Several factors determine the existing array of investment
in different lines of production.
First, individuals make subjective evaluations about
how much to save and invest, in accordance with their vary
ing rates of time preference.

When many individuals are

integrated into markets, the market interest rate (which
includes risk premiums) becomes the price at which money can
be obtained for investment.

Individuals may decide to

invest their savings in return for the additional future
interest return.

Savings are necessary for any investment

in capital goods to take place.
Second, individuals subjectively evaluate what particu
lar investments to make.

The roles of saver and investor

may be played by different individuals, or they may be com
bined.

Recently, mutual funds that invest only in firms

that produce environmental goods (primarily toxic waste
clean-up) have been offered to the public.
Part of the investment decision involves a comparison
of alternative investment returns.

This comparison is par

ticularly important for those who currently own capital
goods involved in the production of environmental goods.

If

owners of the means of production of environmental goods
expect that their factors of production could earn a higher
return in a line of production that would not produce envi
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ronmental goods, they will be likely to sell the goods into
that other line of production.
Scott emphasizes that investors must always be making
choices between alternative investments: "It is, of course,
always desirable to have more of something in the future;
but is it worth the cost of having less of something
else?"(1973,ix)

This statement is valid for decisions about

alternative investments, because the specific materials of
capital goods invested in one line of production cannot be
invested in another line.

The choice is between the pattern

of investment and consumer goods that would occur if in
vestors did not change the pattern of investment and struc
ture of production, and the array of goods that would result
if investors did change it.
one would otherwise have.

The "less" is relative to what
The statement does not mean that

one gets absolutely less of the good in which one does not
invest.

Because all investments are attempts to increase

productivity,

investors are actually trying to get more of

one thing relative to what would otherwise be produced.
This does not lead to a loss in output of competing lines of
production, but only to a decrease relative to what they
could produce with the additional investment.
The market interest rate acts as a rough indicator of
what a potential investor could be earning if he were to
liquidate his capital goods assets and invest the sum of
money at the going interest rate.

It can also be used to
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estimate the present value of future returns from the in
vestment.

Because of time preference,

worth less than the same amount now.

future returns are
An investment in the

production of environmental goods will be made if the pro
jected returns from the investment, discounted by the in
terest rate, are estimated to be greater than what one an
ticipates one could obtain by investment in something else.
This statement is similar to, but not as specific as,
those which link investment and production decisions to an
equilibrium.

Ludwig von Mises used the notion of an evenly

rotating economy as a theoretical construct, but he empha
sized that there was in reality no such thing as equilib
rium.

"Action is to make choices and to cope with an uncer

tain future.

But in the evenly rotating economy there is no

choosing and the future is not uncertain as it does not dif
fer from the present known state.

Such a rigid system is

not peopled with living men making choices and liable to er
ror; it is a world of soulless unthinking automatons; it is
not a human society,

it is an ant hill"

(1966,246-249).

Statements that imply that there is a final unchanging
market equilibrium that can guide our investment and produc
tion decisions are incorrect.

For example, although Scott

criticizes Marshall for his static analysis of the economy,
and although Scott recognizes that over time production may
change, his production rule implies that producers can sit
somewhere outside of time and see for all time periods what
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the earnings of the investment would be, and then adjust
production in the current period accordingly.
should be thought of, according to Scott,

A producer

"as equalizing his

marginal net revenue and his marginal user cost.

When these

two are equal in all periods, the owner will have succeeded
in maximizing the present value of his enterprise."
But for acting humans, the future is uncertain.

(1973,8)

We cannot

know what our user cost (returns from production in some
future period) will be; we can only guess what it might be.
(Scott does occasionally indicate his recognition of the
uncertainty decision-makers face with terms like "expect"
and "attempt.")
Once an investment in capital goods that will produce
environmental goods has been made, a decision must be made
about the rate at which the capital good will be used.
has been a focus of traditional resource economists.

This
They

regard resources as inventories that could be used up at
varying rates.

As a resource is depleted, the market price

of units of it increase, assuming demand remains the same.
But as the resource is depleted, the value of the property
where it is located decreases, since future returns from the
resource are diminished.

A resource owner will have to

guess whether current or future demand is likely to generate
more income.

Taking copper as an example, Murray Rothbard

has outlined how current and future income considerations
work.
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Why is it that copper miners, once they have found and
opened a vein of ore, do not mine all the copper imme
diately; why, instead, do they conserve the copper
mine, add to it, and extract the copper gradually, from
year to year? Because the mine owners realize that,
for example, if they triple this year's production of
copper they may indeed triple this year's income, but
they will also be depleting the mine, and therefore the
future income they will be able to derive from it. . .
. Every mine owner, then, has to weigh the advantages
of immediate income from copper production against the
loss in the "capital value" of the mine as a whole, and
hence against the loss in the value of his shares.(1978,248)
Thus both current demand and prices for a resource, and
expected future demand and prices-, enter into decisions
about rate of production.
of a finite resource.
newable.

The above example was for a case

By today's technology,

it is not re

If copper were to become extremely scarce, and

there were no substitute for it, this would present an op
portunity to an entrepreneur.

The capitalist-entrepreneur

could then risk capital in recycling or reclaiming technol
ogy, and offer to collect copper-containing products thrown
out as waste by-products by other industrial processes or
consumers.
Other resources are more directly renewable.

Owners of

these would be particularly concerned to maintain capital
value.

Assuming that the product continued to be in demand,

an owner would want to continually replace the capital that
produces it so that he could continue to generate income or
when appropriate sell the productive capacity to someone
else at a high price.

For example, a forest would be har
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vested at a certain rate but also replanted to generate a
sustained yield.

The forest would be the stock of the re

source, and the number of trees that could be harvested in
each relevant time period would be the flow that could be
produced.

Similarly, the number of people that could hike

and camp in a forest per relevant time period would be the
flow (number of hiker-hours per season, for example), and
the flora and fauna that would provide the hikers a pleasant
experience would be the stock.

If many people were allowed

to traipse about in the forest in any given time period, the
stock's value would decrease: the yield of enjoyable hikes
in future time periods would decrease.

On the other hand,

if very few people were allowed to hike in the current pe
riod, many more could be allowed to hike in the future.

As

suming that hikers pay the owner to enjoy the forest, the
revenue to the owner of the forest would thus depend on the
rate at which it is used.
This point can be made in the language of costs.

"When

an important indivisible factor is becoming more and more
overutilized, there is a tendency for increasing average
costs.

. . . average costs will first decline with an in

crease in output,

. . . After the technologically most ef

ficient point is reached, however, costs will increase,"
(Rothbard 197 0,533)

For example,

it costs a certain amount

to put a trail through a wilderness.

As the number of hik

ers on the trail increases, maintenance costs per hiker will
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decrease.

But beyond a certain point, hiking will increase

trail maintenance costs.
An individual may decide to completely withhold an en
vironmental good from any production except production for
his own enjoyment.

As Murray Rothbard points out, this is

analogous to withholding labor from work and exertion for
personal enjoyment instead.

Withholding of scenic lands

from enjoyment by others will make those lands scarcer as
economic goods.

Assuming constant or increasing demand for

scenic lands, their price will actually increase.

So,

rental prices for scenic lands will actually increase if
individuals value the lands for that purpose.
case," Rothbard explains,

"In that

"the land would have an increasing

marginal disutility of visual enjoyment forgone, just as
leisure is forgone in the process of expending labor.

. . .

Higher rental prices offered for his land will then induce
the landowner to withhold more of it" (1970,516)

Less land

rented out to hikers at the higher rate they would be will
ing to pay will generate the same amount of income as was
previously obtained by renting out more land at a lower
rate.

So actually, higher demand for these types of envi

ronmental goods contributes to their preservation.
As long as there is private ownership of environmental
goods, capitalist-entrepreneurs will seek the profits they
expect to receive from providing environmental goods to the
consumers who demand them.

Capitalist entrepreneurs will
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attempt to provide environmental goods as long as they ex
pect consumers to demand the goods and to pay prices which
will at least cover the input prices and costs of capital
maintenance.
The capitalist-entrepreneur will evaluate returns to
capital in various lines of production, and if he expects
the return for provision of environmental goods to be rela
tively greater, the investment and production will occur.
Because the only indication to the entrepreneur that he has
made a correct decision is a profit, and because this then
allows him to continue in business,

it is crucial that there

be a market and money prices for both capital and environ
mental goods.

Without monetary calculation, the environ

mental capitalist-entrepreneur can only guess whether he is
providing the environmental goods that consumers demand.
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CHAPTER IV

AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC THEORY APPLIED
TO WATER RESOURCES
Provision of the environmental good, clean water, re
quires private ownership of that environmental good and the
means to produce it.

Markets and prices must exist not only

for the consumer goods but also for the factors that produce
it.

Entrepreneurs must be able to seek profits by devising

ways to use factors of production they estimate are cur
rently undervalued (underpriced) by the market relative to
what consumers will pay for clean water in the future.

They

must also suffer losses when they are mistaken about what
consumers will demand.
WATER QUALITY
Water pollution is primarily a legal rather than an
economic issue.

In "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollu

tion," Murray Rothbard has provided a lucid outline of what
coherent, workable pollution law should be.

Strict lia

bility for physical aggression upon the property of another,
but also rational proof of pollution would be required
(1982a).

55

Provision of clean water to consumers can be compli
cated by pollution.

A pollutant, a bad, is, like a good,

subjectively valued.
strive to remove.
of pollution.

A pollutant is something which we

The good we strive for is the reduction

The definition of a pollutant is similar to

that of a weed in gardening: a weed is any plant that grows
someplace you would

rather it did not.

When the offender is

in your garden, you

dig itup and dispose of it or move it.

When the offender is in your neighbor's garden, you had bet
ter not remove his plant without his permission, because
though ugly to you,

it may be a prize-winner to him.

larly, mercury and cyanide are useful in the

Simi

separation of

gold, but if they get in your duck pond, they are pollu
tants.

A pollutant is material that occurs where you would

rather it did not.

When it has migrated into your property,

you may get rid of it.

When it is on someone else's

property, you better let it be.

If as a result of someone

else's activity, pollutant materials damage your property,
you should be able to demand restitution and require that
the polluters cease the pollution.

Pollution problems are

primarily problems of effective definition and enforcement
of property rights.

Water quality is primarily a legal

question of violation of property rights.
To state that water quality is a legal issue is not to
state that political involvement is necessary.

A tradition

of exploration of how free markets historically did and
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could again provide legal and defense services has been de
veloping.

See The Enterprise of Law (Benson 1991) and

"Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of
Security,"

(Hoppe 1989b).

Pollution is not fundamentally an economic issue, be
cause it involves violation of property rights rather than
exchanges of titles to economic goods.

It is particularly

not an issue of entrepreneurship and effective use of capi
tal to satisfy consumer demand.

There are, however, three

ways in which entrepreneurs might be involved in anti-pollu
tion services.
Entrepreneurs might provide pollution detection and de
fense services such as, for example, monitoring and identi
fication technologies so that owners of water resources
could prove that pollution had occurred and what the source
was.

Although pollution would be a crime, it would make

sense for owners of valuable water resources to invest in
services that would make prosecution of violators more
likely, and violation in the first place unlikely.

This is

entirely analogous to protection against violation of other
owned property, such as homes or cars.

The technology for

this protection in water pollution is rudimentary.

The

equivalent of fingerprint records or fences are not yet
available.
Part of the reason for the unavailability of antipollu
tion technologies is that pollution into common pools of air
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and water are relatively costless to the polluter.
Capitalist-entrepreneurs cannot project returns from in
vestment in research to invent and produce antipollution
technology when there are no likely consumers or no con
sumers likely to pay profitable prices.

If polluters do not

expect to get caught or to pay high damages if they are
caught, they are unlikely to pay for antipollution technol
ogy.

As Morton J. Horwitz explained, by the mid-nineteenth

century the legal system in the United States had changed
from strict liability for what were then called "nuisances"
(pollution) to a system which subsidizes economic growth by
protecting industry from liability and damages (1977).
Although "fence" technologies to prevent pollutants
from entering the water resource in the first place are less
well developed, entrepreneurs could supply clean-up services
after pollution has occurred.
neutralized with lime.

Acidified lakes can be

Recent advances in water clean-up

research and technology include genetically engineered bac
teria that can feed on oil and some that may be able to feed
on presumed carcinogenic substances such as polychlorinated
biphenyls

(PCBs), pentachlorophenols (PCPs) and

trichloroethylene (TCE).

PCBs and PCPs are carbon ring com

pounds with multiple chlorine atoms attached.

These are in

dustrial products: PCPs are used in wood preservatives, PCBs
are used in electrical transformers, and TCEs are used as
industrial solvents or washing liquids, such as for circuit
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boards.

Bacterial biochemical pathways differ from human

biochemistry in ways that can be enhanced through genetic
engineering.

Bacteria can use substances that are toxic to

humans as a source of energy.

The process of bacterial con

sumption breaks the compounds down into simpler molecules or
atoms that are harmless to humans.

Simple cement lime to

precipitate PCBs may be a clean-up method that does not re
quire genetically engineered organisms.
Protection and remediation of contaminated property is
a service and produces a good which can be sold to con
sumers.

It is the role of the entrepreneur to attempt to

offer these services.

Environmental water entrepreneurs

could buy polluted water at discounted prices, clean it, and
sell it at a higher price to reap a profit.

Private vendors

of filtered water are already performing this service.

This

service is sold to those willing to purchase purer water
than they can obtain at a lower price.
Although entrepreneurship is involved in the production
of the environmental good, clean water, or water of a cer
tain quality, the remaining focus here is simply on provi
sion of the quantities of water that consumers demand.
MARKET DEMAND
Water resources must be privately owned so that prices
can indicate what consumers demand.
than a market to determine this.

There is no way other

Subjective consumer values
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change from time to time.

By the law of marginal utility,

demand must be negatively related to price.

Estimation of

the value of an additional unit of water, however, varies
from individual to individual and from time to time.

Sur

veys and projections are of little use compared to actual
market prices.
Some economists have exerted tremendous effort to prove
that the demand for water is actually elastic.

(Total rev

enue from sales of water decrease as the price of water in
creases.

Price and total revenue are negatively correlated,

so elasticities have negative values.)

Diana C. Gibbons re

viewed studies of demand for and value of water in seven
different economic sectors: municipal,

irrigation,

indus

trial, waste assimilation (pollution and water quality),
recreational, navigation, and hydroelectric.

In each of

these sectors, water consumption is broken down into varying
uses.

For example, municipal water use can be public or

residential, and residential water use can in turn be broken
down into indoor and outdoor use.

Price elasticities of de

mand for municipal use averaged -0.37 in the eastern United
States and -0.54 in the western United States.

It was clear

to Gibbons that it would not be analytically useful to av
erage the two halves of the country, because their water
demand and use were significantly different.

Gibbons ex

plains that "overall price elasticities vary across regions,
with the more elastic demand in regions where outdoor use
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comprises a larger fraction of total use"

(1986,10).

within regions, however, elasticities vary.

Even

For example, a

time-series study for Tucson, Arizona, conducted by Young,
reported an elasticity of -0.62 for 1946 to 1965, and -0.41
for 1965-1971, while a 1964 study by Gardner-Schick esti
mated elasticity of demand for water in northern Utah at 0.77 (1986,10-11).
In one of the earliest studies of demand for water,
Linaweaver, Geyer, and Wolff reported the results of a Johns
Hopkins University survey of residential water use (1967).
From 1961-1966, researchers collected data from sixteen wa
ter utilities around the country.

These studies report sea

sonal variations in daily water use and weekly patterns of
hourly water use, with peak use much greater than average
use.

Again, averages are not extremely useful analytical

tools.

The average daily use for all the study areas was

398 gallons, but the peak daily demand in the East Bay Mu
nicipal Utility District was 1,534 gallons.
ities of demand,

Given elastic

it might be possible for water suppliers to

charge more for water demanded during peaks than for nonpeak
water.

This would increase revenue and lower peaks.

Lineaweaver and coauthors report a correlation coefficient
of 0.76 for water demand with economic level of the house
hold (estimated by average market value of homes in the
area).

Their explanation of this is that more expensive

homes have more water-using appliances and larger lawns.
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Steve Hanke and Lennart de Mare estimated water demand
from a study of Malmo, Sweden (1982).

Their study was pro

voked by the results of prior study of the region which re
ported, in apparent contradiction to economic theory, a pos
itive correlation between price of water and per capita wa
ter production.

The problem with the previous study was

that it used water production as an estimate of water use.
Economic theory does not rule out the existence of increased
supply of a good with increasing price.

Over time,

producers bring more supply to market if they expect to ob
tain a higher price.

A more general problem with any study

of demand is that demand is always shifting.

Particular

pairs of price and quantity demanded data may lie on one de
mand curve, or on different curves.

In any actual study

which takes place over time, demand can shift, so that re
sults can be given alternative interpretations.

(For this

problem of using empirical data as tests of economic theory,
see Hoppe 1983.)
Hanke and coauthor allowed economic theory to inform
their study: "Demand theory indicates that the amount of a
commodity that consumers demand in any time period should be
negatively correlated with its real price.

Therefore,

necessary to question and critique " the prior study.
and de Mare 1982,621)

it is
(Hanke

It is of methodological interest that

Hanke!s faith in the superiority of economic theory was not
unwavering.

In a later article on water privatization,
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Hanke and coauthor J.K. Walters wrote, "it is only through
examining the available evidence that the validity of any
theory can be judged"

(1987,106).

This dual approach to the

relative status of theory and data reveals a confusion about
when theory should indicate that data are being incorrectly
interpreted, and when data should be allowed to determine
validity of theories.

The Austrian approach is unequivocal:

deductively established theory is used to inform and judge
empirical research.

Hanke followed this approach in his re

vision of the Malmo research.

"[F]or purposes of modeling

water demands, we must employ water use data that are
measured by metered consumption, not production.

It is this

use that individuals and firms can control directly by their
individual water use decisions.

Hence, it is this use that

reflects the amount of water that consumers and firms demand
at various prices"

(1982,622).

Another problem with the earlier Malmo study was that
it aggregated users of different classes.

"The aggregation

of water use classes presents a problem in demand modeling
because different classes of water users respond to price
changes in different ways.

That is, they have different

price elasticities for water demand.

Hence, the demand

elasticity obtained by using aggregate water use (or pro
duction) will be nothing more than a weighted average elas
ticity"

(1982,622).
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The final problem Hanke mentioned is a general one for
all cross-sectional demand studies.

Even if one obtains a

significant correlation for different individuals across
space, that cannot be used to predict demand by the same in
dividual over time.
Hanke and de Mare remedied these problems in their
study.

They used fourteen semi-annual time periods during

which the nominal price of water changed five times and the
real price changed in twelve of the fourteen periods.

In

their cross-sectional studies, they divided groups into
classes by income, age of household members, and rainfall.
They obtained water use data from meter, not production,
records.

Their pooled, time series, cross section study

generated a price elasticity of demand for water of -0.15.
What is useful about all these studies of water demand
is not that they establish something that economic theory
had already proven, but that they reveal regional and sea
sonal variations in demand which may be useful to producers
who plan ahead for delivery of water services.

These cannot

be a substitute for a supplier to have his finger on the
pulse of the market, however.

The studies lead one to ques

tion whether if there are regional and seasonal variations
in demand, why not ethnic (some cultures shower a lot, oth
ers less; some cultures fry more food, others boil more
food), age-related (children may play outside and be fre
quently bathed), occupation (blue collar workers may do more
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clothes washing that white-collar workers), land-owning
(city apartment dwellers don't water lawns but suburbanites
d o ) , etc.

Because every individual has some unique combina

tion of these various qualities, one can conclude that the
market,

in which individuals actually act, is the best means

to determine what has satisfied individuals.

For a review

of elasticity of water demand studies, see The Economic
Value of Water (Gibbons 1986) .
POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
When social, legal, or political institutions

prevent

private ownership of water resources, usually some govern
ment agency is given the power to decide what

uses of water

or changes in its distribution of use are in "the public in
terest."

Under an Austrian analysis, because the public is

nothing other than the individuals who comprise it and who
reveal their preferences in their market actions, the only
way to ascertain public interest is to allow individuals to
act freely in the market.

For an Austrian analysis of so

cial welfare theory, see (Rothbard 1956).
Even non-Austrian water resource economists recognize
the difficulties involved in public interest law.
Many western states explicitly include a public inter
est or public welfare clause in their statutes refer
ring to water right appropriations and sometimes in
their statutes referring to water transfers.
However,
with few exceptions, the public interest is not statu
torily defined;. . . Nevada statutes require rejection
of transfer applications if the transfer threatens to

65

prove detrimental to the public interest.
What con
stitutes the public interest is not statutorily defined
and the public interest criterion is applied to trans
fer applications by the State Engineer on a case-bycase basis." (Saliba and Bush 1987,71,72).
Saliba and Bush do not clearly recommend that the free
market be the sole means to define what is in the "public
interest" but rather that more specific criteria be explic
itly written into law, so that the existing political admin
istration of water resources is better defined and the rule
of law is more predictable.

The problem with legislative

law is that it can become unpredictable if each new legisla
ture can change it.

Bruno Leoni explores these problems in

Freedom and the Law (1972).

From his analysis,

it would be

better to allow judges to discover law as they make their
decisions about property rights conflicts, rather than to
have political representatives make law that pleases their
constituents.
Jack Hirshleifer, James C. De Haven, and Jerome W. Milliman discuss the problem of corruption of government offi
cials in their thorough treatment of water economics (1970).
"This problem is of some significance for water-resource
decisions, because of the growing trend in state legislation
toward placing all water use under the jurisdiction of a
water commission generally given only some vague highsounding phrase on the basis of which to decide who should
be granted the use of the water resource and who should be
refused"

(84).
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Hirshleifer and his coauthors also hint that political
control of water has been a key to solidification of power:
"It is of some historical interest that Wittfogel's monumen
tal study of oriental despotism assigns a crucial if not
all-determining role to centralized control of water re
sources in the historical formation and maintenance of that
characteristically bureaucratic form of government"

(85).

(The work referred to is Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despo
tism. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1957.)
Despite their survey of several public choice and other
political arguments against government intervention in
markets, Hirshleifer and coauthors have no overall ir
refutable argument against such intervention: "our purpose
is to establish somewhat convincingly that one cannot read
ily assume that perfect or even reasonably satisfactory po
litical processes are available to correct market imperfec
tions.

Instead, it is necessary to consider the prospects

for useful corrective action case by case" (86).
Some economists have examined the economic consequences
of conversion from public to private provision of water.
Steve Hanke and Stephen Walters described some of the eco
nomic benefits of such a conversion and explained why it
would work.

"Private enterprises should be expected to be

more efficient than public enterprises precisely because a
private owner stands to gain enhanced wealth from improve
ments in efficiency, reduction in cost, and the like.

To
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put it another way, a private owner stands to forgo wealth
if improvements in efficiency, reductions in cost, and the
like are not pursued.

In essence, private owners face sig

nificant incentives to monitor the behavior of managers and
employees so that they will supply what consumers demand and
do so in a cost-effective way."

(1987,105)

Hanke and Walters also suggest that managers be given a
share of profits or stock options to elicit the best perfor
mance by managers with a minimum of monitoring by owners.
This would be more important for a firm that contracted for
a monopoly supply position than for a private firm in a more
competitive market.

Private firms need not always offer

profit sharing as incentives to managers.

If this is not

enough, then the market will reflect the decreased perfor
mance:

"If the actions of incumbent managers are inappro

priate, profits and share prices will be lower than they
should be.

This attracts corporate takeover specialists,

.

. . . The threat of corporate takeovers thus helps disci
pline incumbent managements and generates an efficient pro
vision of goods and services"

(1987,105).

Public provision of water lacks these market incentives
for efficiency.

Generally one public agency holds a

monopoly of water provision, and there can be no takeover if
the agency is inefficient.

Hanke cites a study by W. Mark

Crain and Asghar Zardkoohi which "established that public
firms' low labor productivity and underutilization of
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capital equipment led to operating costs about 25 percent
higher than in the private companies"

(1987,106).

Hanke and Walters address the question of whether water
provision is a natural monopoly.

Because costs for larger

pipes increase proportionately less than the amount of water
they can deliver, water supply would seem to be an industry
of always decreasing average cost.

(The cross-sectional

area of a pipe, which determines how much water it can
transport,

is equal to pi (3.14) times the square of the

radius, while the circumference of a pipe, which determines
its cost, is equal to 2 times pi times the radius.

Thus, if

the radius is doubled, the circumference is doubled but the
area increases four times, so that costs increase less
rapidly than area.)

Pipe costs are not the only costs for a

water supply company, however.

There are meters, pumps,

research and development, advertising, billing, customer
service, and offices.

Each of these costs will have its own

economies of scale and may not follow the decreasing average
costs of the pipes.

Even if water supply is a "natural

monopoly," however, this does not imply that it must be a
government operated or regulated enterprise.
brings its own problems.

Regulation

Hanke cites problems of "capture"

of regulatory agencies by the industries they are supposed
to discipline.
Murray Rothbard has outlined the problems with tradi
tional monopoly theory and refined and improved Austrian
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monopoly theory.

In the free market, exchanges are mutually

beneficial; exchanges expected not to be beneficial do not
take place.
ble.

Every seller charges as high a price as possi

Thus it is impossible on the free market to find a

"monopoly" price distinguishable from a competitive price.
Traditional monopoly theory is also based on the notion that
in "perfect" competition, demand is perfectly elastic; that
is, demand could be depicted by a perfectly horizontal line.
This would mean that at the market price, there is infinite
demand, but at a price just above or below it, there would
be no demand.

Demand arises from ranking of ends and the

means to achieve them.
marginal utility.

It is based on the law of decreasing

For every individual, as the stock of a

homogeneous good increases, the utility of an additional
unit of the good decreases.

This means that in exchange,

individuals will relinquish marginal units of a good for
less than they would relinquish the previous unit.

This

principle can be depicted as a demand curve which slopes
downward to the right: as the price of a good increases, the
quantity demanded of it decreases.

A horizontal demand

curve would mean that marginal units of a good would be re
linquished for the same amount as the previous unit.
violates the law of marginal utility.

This

The law of marginal

utility is the foundation of further economic constructs;
such constructs must never violate the law of marginal util
ity.

Therefore, a horizontal demand curve is an invalid
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construct.

What is left of traditional monopoly theory is

only the old notion that a monopoly is a government-granted
privilege of protection against competition (Rothbard
1960,560-660).
In partial answer to the problems of government-granted
monopolies, some economists have proposed that potential
operators of the monopolies be required to bid competitively
for it.

Hanke cites Chadwick's suggestion of competition

"'for the field'"

(1987,108).

Hanke emphasizes that the

monopoly should be awarded to that bidder who supplies the
good to the consumer at the lowest price and highest qual
ity.

But even this isn't good enough from an Austrian per

spective.
rior?

Why play at markets when real markets are supe

The awarder of a monopoly could not know that the

monopoly supplier would provide goods to consumers at the
lowest price and highest quality.

There would be no effec

tive consumer demand in this situation, because consumers
would be prevented from withdrawing their purchases and
turning to another supplier.

Also, the supplier would not

be subject to takeovers.
Hanke cites less serious problems of a bidding process
itself and the details of running a monopoly firm.

He sug

gests that a "buyers' agency" could represent consumers
(1987,109).

But from an Austrian perspective there is no

better buyers' agency than the free market.

Hanke's conclu

sion is that franchise bidding according to the above guide-
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lines constitutes privatization, and he calls firms in
France and Spain that receive such franchise awards
"private"(110-112).

From an Austrian perspective, these are

not private firms because they have in fact been granted
monopolies by government.
To say that there are problems with government-granted
monopolies of water supply is not to say that such monopo
lies cannot supply water to consumers.
complished.

Clearly this is ac

The point is that such provision cannot take

advantage of the market.

Even if a monopoly arises in a

free market, as long as there are no obstacles to free com
petition it is susceptible to new firms entering the market.
Any free market monopoly would therefore be potentially open
to future competition.

A government-granted monopoly is not

similarly unprotected from competition.

As a result,

consumers will not be supplied as well as they would be in a
free market.
Harold Demsetz examined arguments for government regu
lation of utilities.

He found that the theory of natural

monopoly is incoherent.

From the mere fact of economics of

scale, he points out, it does not follow that there will be
monopoly prices, because decreasing average costs do not
necessarily imply only one supplier.

"[TJhere is no clear

or necessary reason for production scale economies to de
crease the number of bidders.

Let prospective buyers call

for bids to service their demands.

Scale economies in ser

72

vicing their demands in no way imply that there will be one
bidder only.

. . . Economies of scale in production imply

that the bids submitted will offer increasing quantities at
lower per-unit costs, but production scale economies imply
nothing obvious about how competitive these prices will be"
(1968,57).

Demsetz affirms the point that one cannot dis

tinguish between monopoly and competitive prices: "The im
portant point that needs stressing is that we have no theory
that allows us to deduce from the observable degree of con
centration in a particular market whether or not price and
output are competitive"

(59-61).

Demsetz concludes that

"the rivalry of the open market place disciplines more ef
fectively than do the regulatory processes of the commis
sion"

(65) .
In his discussion of water markets, Rodney Smith comes

close to the Austrian emphasis on the superiority of markets
as providers of goods to consumers.

"In short, a market can

guide individuals to conserve and reallocate water resources
in ways that increase the economic benefits of water
resources to society.

It also provides adequate compensa

tion for those who relinquish water,

in the sense that they

voluntarily accept compensation in exchange for their water"
(1988,12).
Private ownership implies the right to prosecute
against theft and violations of property rights.

It not

only means that the owner has the right to purchase water;
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it also means that he can do whatever he wishes with the wa
ter so long, of course, as in doing so he does not physi
cally damage someone else's property.

Once a consumer has

purchased water, that consumer must be able to do what he
wishes with it.

If someone else forcibly intervenes with

the consumer's use of his water, a violation of a property
right has occurred.

For example, Las Vegas residents can be

levied fines of up to one thousand dollars for allowing
water to run into the street.

According to Jerry M. Belt,

J r . , of the Las Vegas Valley Water District, no one has yet
been prosecuted under the law, but warnings have been issued
(interview, 1991)

This example is complicated by the fact

that neither the water district nor the streets are pri
vately owned.

If the street were privately owned, the

streetowner might be able to seek damages from the person
who ran water into the street.

What is clear, however, is

that once a purchaser of water has paid for it, it is his to
use as he wishes.

The threat of a fine is a violation of

private property rights.

For a systematic treatment of

third-party intervention in the property rights and actions
of others, see Power and Market (Rothbard 1977a) .
Encouragement of water conservation would not consti
tute a violation of property rights.

People who want to

reduce their water bills are willing to pay for water-saving
landscape consulting and installment services.

Individual

homeowners and commercial property owners also install wa

74

ter-saving appliances to save on water bills.

It is impor

tant that all these transactions remain free and uncoerced
so that prices can indicate just what consumers value, and
additional supply can arise to meet their demand.
Given that individuals can own water resources, that
ownership must include the ability to freely transfer the
property title to someone else.

If this is not allowed,

water allocations are frozen in time or slowed through a bu
reaucratic political process.

Producers cannot efficiently

supply consumers' needs when those needs change.
A current water problem in Nevada illustrates the prob
lems of the political as opposed to the economic means of
acquiring goods.

The Las Vegas Valley Water District has

petitioned the state water engineer for permits to pump and
pipe water from rural counties.

The rural counties, repre

sented by their district attorneys, oppose these water
transfers.

Thousands of protests to the proposed transfers

have been filed with the state water engineer and hearings
are projected to last several years.

In the meantime, the

water district has had to discontinue commitments to supply
water to new developments, and this has repercussions on the
building industry.

This conflict has been extensively re

ported in the Las Vegas Review Journal.
If individuals in the rural counties could privately
own water, they could set a price below which they would not
sell.

Water suppliers in Las Vegas could set a price above
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which they would not purchase water from the rural dis
tricts.

If no agreement could be reached between buyer and

seller, the exchange would not occur.

If they agreed upon a

price, rural counties would receive income, and Las Vegans
would probably be encouraged to reduce water consumption
(practice conservation) of the expensive water.

Although

costs are historical events which are paid before a product
reaches its market (costs are paid out of advanced capital
rather than passed on to consumers) developers would make
smaller profits from sales of new homes and commercial cen
ters unless they could charge higher prices to cover what
they paid for the more expensive water.

Higher prices for

consumers and reduced profits for developers would create
natural market limits to growth.
Exchanges of property rights to water have become a fo
cus of water resource analysts in recent years.

In his hy

pothetical study of a generic "Arid City" and its attempts
to acquire water, Rodney Smith emphasizes the necessity of
water markets and contrasts them with the likely outcome of
political acquisitions of water.
How would Arid City Municipal Water District search for
new supplies under a water policy that severely limits
water transfers? ACMWD would turn to the legislature,
the regulatory commission, and the courtroom to rest
[sic] surface or ground waters from agricultural users.
The inevitable political controversy would require spe
cial commissions to study the wisdom of transferring
water . . . for use in Arid City.
More effort would be
devoted to legal reviews of proposed conservation prac
tices and reallocations of existing supplies.
Less ef
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fort would be spent on finding ways to conserve water
and ensure efficiency in reallocating existing supplies
to new uses.. . . The outcomes may primarily depend on
the exercise of political power.
The presence of real
economic losses could become a secondary issue.
Under
an administrative system water transfers would become
unduly politicized.
Given the trend toward urbaniza
tion in western states, it takes little imagination to
predict the likely winner of such a pitched and expen
sive political battle (1988,74-75).
Part of the answer to efficient water provision is
therefore to eliminate political involvement in water trans
fers.
More should not be read into the word 'efficiency' than
simply the structure of production and array of goods that
arises in a free market.

Water market analysts Saliba and

Bush recognize several problems with defining efficiency in
any other way yet like most resource economists they still
use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate efficiency.

They seem

to be led into this by examining water transfers rather than
exchanges of property titles to water.

Murray Rothbard

clarified Austrian theory by emphasizing that in a market
transaction, what is actually exchanged are property titles
to goods (1970,78).

Any confusion about this point tends to

lead to a role for intervention in mutual exchange.
Saliba and Bush slip away from a focus on acting indi
viduals to a more mechanistic description of flow of goods
without the involvement of human will.

They characterize

transfers as involving "trade-offs; they make some individu
als better off and leave others worse off" (1987,13).

Ac 

cording to Austrian economic theory, no exchange of goods
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will take place unless both parties expect it to be benefi
cial.

Exchangers might ex post find themselves worse-off

but if ex ante they would have expected to be made worseoff, the exchange would not have occurred.

An element of

coercion must occur for individuals to transfer goods if
they expect to be made worse-off by the transfer.

This is

the case with taxation, for example.
It is true that all actions involve trade-offs, but
this is from the point of view of the acting individual.
The individual's opportunity cost is his next highest ranked
alternative action which he would have pursued had he not
decided to perform the action or engage in the exchange that
he did in fact make.

The trade-off is not between some

individuals being worse-off and others better-off but
between an action and its opportunity cost for each acting
individual.

Costs are not born by some while benefits are

born by others.

Each individual bears costs and benefits as

a result of his own preferences and choices in action.
Individuals make subjective evaluations of costs and
benefits.
Saliba and Bush recognize that cost-benefit analysis is
a deficient analytical tool.

The more sophisticated Kaldor-

Hicks version states that a projected change would be
efficient if compensation to those who would bear costs
could be made by those who would benefit yet the latter
would still be better off than they would be without the
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change.

Saliba and Bush recognize that even this formula

tion has problems.
The Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion has been criti
cized widely as a basis for public policy.
Resource
policy recommendations based upon it are contingent on
current resource allocations and tend to reinforce the
status quo. The ethical, conceptual and practical dif
ficulties of valuing changes in individuals' well-being
and the problems of identifying those who would be
beneficially or adversely affected by a water transfer
also make implementation of efficiency criteria a com
plex and subjective process.
Nevertheless, cost bene
fit analysis based on Kaldor-Hicks remains the standard
economic approach to evaluating water project proposals
and water policy alternatives (1986,14).
An Austrian would respond that because evaluations are
subjective, they should be left to the exchangers and to the
capitalist-entrepreneurs who risk their own wealth on faulty
appraisals.

Economists who use "the standard approach" may

not be risking their own wealth on those formulations.

They

may receive an income whether or not the standard approach
is successful.

Therefore, they are unlikely to recognize

when they fail, or to lose wealth as a result of the
failure.

If they do not lose wealth as a result of

deficient tools, they are unlikely to search for better
ones.

Capitalist-entrepreneurs, on the other hand, are

subject to market reminders of failure.

In a free market,

risk is born by the capitalist-entrepreneurs, and their
mistakes reduce their wealth and thus their ability to con
tinue to make further mistakes and waste resources.
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The extent of capital and water resource waste in the
United States has recently received a thorough examination
by Richard W. Wahl, an economist in the Office of Policy
Analysis at the United States Department of the Interior.
In his review of Bureau of Reclamation projects, he discov
ered that subsidies to western agriculture had been mas
sively underestimated.

According to his calculations, con

struction cost subsidies, below-market interest rates on
loans, extensions of loan repayment periods, loan defer
ments, and various administrative allowances for borrowers'
"ability to pay" increased subsidies to over ninety percent
for some projects; subsidies of eighty-five and eighty-six
percent were common.

This information is presented in

charts and text throughout the first part of Wahl's book
(1989,3-124).
Of particular interest for private provision of water
is Wahl's examination of "ability to pay."

The Bureau of

Reclamation defines this criterion as a percentage of net
income of a typical farm that will receive water from the
reclamation project.

Net income of a typical farm, Wahl re

ports, is estimated by "taking the expected crop revenues
less expenses for seed, equipment, land (exclusive of water
cost), and hired labor and an imputed cost for family farm
labor."(1989,39)

The Bureau of Reclamation defines "ability

to pay" as seventy-five percent of net income.

All the com

pounded estimates that this definition involves might lead
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one to look for a simpler definition anchored in actual mar
ket transactions, and this is precisely what Wahl did.
Wahl asks, "How accurate is this method in determining
ability to pay?

One way to answer this question is to exam

ine what price irrigators actually pay for land with a fed
eral water supply when the land is resold.

The difference

in land values with and without a federal water supply is a
functioning market test of irrigators' actual willingness to
pay (and ability to pay) for project water"

(1989,39).

discovered that according to this market test,

Wahl

"willingness

to pay ranges from 1.5 to 51 times the repayment to the fed
eral government."

Of seven of eighteen projects evaluated,

Wahl suggests, "On these seven projects, willingness to pay
ranges from 1.1 to 4.6 times full cost, indicating that
these projects might well have been viable under private de
velopment even without the various water subsidies provided
by the federal government"

(1989,41).

Thus when one exam

ines actual human choices as they are revealed in market ac
tions, one discovers even more scope for market provision of
water.
Wahl makes detailed recommendations for how federal wa
ter policy can be changed to "facilitate voluntary water
transfers."

Although transfers between users of federal wa

ter exist, Wahl recommends that transfer law be clarified so
that it is not subject to administrative vicissitudes.

Many

of his proposals would help to eliminate uncertainties about
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just what rights to water entitle one to do with the water.
For example, if federal water law were to recognize current
users of federal irrigation water as holders of property
titles to the water, Wahl recommends that they should be
able to sell their titles to urban customers.

In many ways,

his proposals represent a way to desocialize federal water.
By recognizing existing users as holders of property rights,
and allowing them to exchange those rights in markets,
W a h l 's proposals would go a long way toward creating water
markets.

Although Wahl recommends a continued role for the

federal government as a "facilitator" of transactions, he
clearly recognizes the advantages of free markets.
The principal goal of a policy to facilitate water
transfers is to promote efficient water use.
Over
time, the water demands in any locale change in ways
that could not possibly have been foreseen by the orig
inal planners of a water resource project.
For exam
ple, water demands may shift because of changes in de
mand for certain crops, the siting of new energy fa
cilities, or unforeseen population growth.
Therefore,
the original allocations of water probably do not re
sult in water being used where it is most needed years
later. Voluntary market transfers of water allow the
water to be used where present demands are greatest.
Adopting a policy to facilitate water transfers would
also allow greater flexibility in meeting future needs
(Wahl 1989,180).
For a clear example of the way in which desocialization
of "public" assets can occur, see (Hoppe 1990).
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CHAPTER V

AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC THEORY APPLIED
TO GROUNDWATER
Given that private water ownership and transfer of
property titles to water should exist to efficiently provide
water to consumers, particular features of and implications
for groundwater must be considered.
HYDROLOGY
Groundwater occurs in subterranean lakes or streams in
rock structures of varying porosity.

Aquifers vary in size,

depth, flow rate, flow pattern, and other hydrogeologic
characteristics.

The United States Geological Survey has

been performing a series of studies of groundwater.

General

results are known for many regional aquifers (United States
Geological Survey 1985).

Other studies, such as those of

pollutant travel in groundwater, are only in their first
phase and will not generate complete detailed information
for decades (United States Geological Survey 1986).
Some aquifers (groundwater lakes) are like vast sponges
underground.

Others are confined by nearly solid layers of

rock so that water cannot flow out of or into them from
other layers beneath the ground.

Unconfined aquifers may be
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replenished from underground water flowing laterally or per
colating vertically.

The aguifer classification scheme is

actually a continuum from confined to unconfined aquifers,
with semiconfined or leaky confined aquifers between.
In some places, the normal level of groundwater (water
table)

is so high that it is right at the land surface.

In

other places, for example the side of a mountain, a layer of
groundwater-bearing rock may be exposed so that water runs
out of the side of the mountain as a spring.

Some groundwa

ter is under pressure so that once it is drilled into, the
water spurts upward.

These are artesian wells.

For exam

ple, in the Dakota aquifer of South Dakota, wells drilled
beginning in 1881 delivered as much as 4,000 gallons of wa
ter per minute without being pumped (United States Geologi
cal Survey 1985,111).

In most cases, water must be pumped

out of aquifers against gravity.
Surface water from precipitation or return flows of
run-off water from irrigation may replenish an aquifer.

Hy-

drologists keep track of the "water balance" in an aquifer:
flows into the aquifer (recharge) minus flows out
(discharge) yield the additions or depletions of the
aquifer.

Most aquifers show seasonal fluctuations in level

or water balance, usually on the order of a few feet to tens
of feet.
In many regions of the country, aquifers are being
"mined": pumping out is greater than recharge.

Some
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aquifers are showing net decreases in water levels of hun
dreds of feet.

In the Dakota aquifer, water levels are es

timated to have declined 520 feet from 1888 to 1915 (United
States Geological Survey 1985,112)

Some groundwater level

declines may be reversed if pumping rates decrease.

When

groundwater mining occurs in looser rock layers, the aquifer
structure may collapse.

The overlying land subsides and the

capacity of the rock structure to function as a natural
water container may be destroyed or decreased.
sinkholes may be due to water mining.

Some

For example, near

Mendota in the San Joaquin Valley in California, groundwater
levels declined about 260 feet between 1940 and 1963.

The

level of the ground in the area subsided 29 feet from 1940
to 1977

(United States Geological Survey 1985,107).

Begin

ning in 1968, canals brought water into the valley so that
groundwater withdrawals could decrease.

Water levels had

risen 200 feet by 1977, but then declined 100 feet again
during a two year drought.
Because it takes energy to pump water up and out of the
ground against gravity, decreases in the water level in
crease pumping costs, given constant energy prices.

In

Floyd County, Texas, wells tap the High Plains aquifer.
John Schefter reports that "between 1945 and 1984, the water
level in an observation well in Floyd County decreased from
60 to 245 feet below the land surface,"
logical Survey 1985,114).

(United States Geo

This decline nearly doubled the
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pumping cost.

Subtracting out the effects of energy price

changes and assuming a constant price level for energy,
pumping costs due to water level declines increased 172 per
cent from 1952 to 1981 (United States Geological Survey
1985,115).

Pumping and water level in an aquifer are there

fore of great economic concern for water suppliers.
In aquifers located near oceans, rapid pumping of
freshwater may draw saltwater into the aquifer (saltwater
intrusion), destroying the aquifer as a freshwater source.
When wells are sunk near each other, but one is deeper than
another, rapid pumping of the lower well may suck water up
so fast that it no longer flows near the shallower well and
the shallower well dries up.

The area around the rapidly-

pumped well is referred to as a "cone of depression."
WATER RIGHTS
Just as it would create conflicts to grant several in
dividuals property rights to an entire surface body of water
because their rights would conflict, so it creates problems
to grant more than one individual a right to all the water
in an aquifer.

Cones of depression, generally declining wa

ter levels, salt water intrusion and land subsidence are a 1!
problems that can occur with aquifers.

While one water user

might not mind the increased pumping costs due to declining
water levels, others might.
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The unit of a good that is owned and exchanged in the
market must correspond to the physical extent of the good.
For example, to allow more than one person to own a whole
house creates conflicts.

Individuals may discover ways to

divide the physical unit into smaller units that can be ex
changed.

A homeowner may divide part of his home, add a new

outdoor entrance to it, and lease it.
operate to share one home.

Individuals might co

Still, however, title to the

economic unit belongs to one individual (or legal equiva
lent, a corporation, with shares of ownership).
Aquifers often underlie the property boundaries of sev
eral surface landowners.

If all surface landowners are

given a right to the entire aquifer, their exercise of those
rights will conflict.

If one owner decides to exchange all

the water with another party in another waterbasin (the un
derground equivalent of a watershed), then the rights of the
other owners are violated.

Their property is stolen.

Clearly this system is unworkable.
Problems of "common pool" resources have been examined
by economists.

In what Garrett Hardin referred to as "the

tragedy of the commons," individuals tend to exploit as much
of a common pool resource as possible to derive income from
it before other individuals deplete it (1968).

Hardin

claimed that individual choices in common pool situations
are detrimental to other individuals, so that "freedom in a
commons brings ruin to all" and therefore individual freedom
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in those cases must be restricted (1968,1244).

Hardin

recognized that pool resources may be privatized to overcome
depletion and conflicts.

This is easier to accomplish for

public lands with fixed boundaries than it is for a fluid
resource like water.

For air and water, Hardin recommended

"coercive laws or taxing devices" to prevent pollution
(1968,1245).

He saw "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon

by the majority of the people affected" as the only way out
of the tragedy (1968,1247).
WATER LAW
Hardin's solution requires artificial coercion because
he neglects a factual constraint of human action.
takes place in time.

Action

This means that one user of a common

pool resource got there first, someone else was second, and
so on.

A tragedy of depletion need not occur if the rights

of those prior in time are respected.

The doctrine of prior

appropriation embodies this approach to water rights.
Murray Rothbard has recommended that the first person
to sink a well into an underground body of water should pos
sess title to that amount of water that he actually uses.
"Where there are underground rivers, the first appropriator
can own his portion of water and use it however he wishes.
There is no reason for him to own the whole river,

. . . ,

the first appropriator and later buyers own the first used
portion of a river flow, and the next appropriator owns the
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next downstream portion used"

(1956,64).

Each user would

then have a right to a certain flow from the aquifer.

The

aquifer as a whole would not be owned, but only rights to
flows of water from it.

Barring overestimations of the

amount of water actually available in an aquifer (because
seasonal or yearly or longer term fluctuations can occur),
no two individuals would have rights to the same water, and
thus their rights would not conflict.
The doctrine of prior appropriation is not the only ap
proach to water rights that has been recognized in water
law.

An alternative approach is called riparian rights.

Riparian water rights belong to riparian land owners along a
stream.

Any riparian land holder, whether prior in time or

not, has a right to as much of the river flow as he desires.
Riparian rights can apply not only to surface streams but
also to underground water.

In that case the riparian right

holder is the owner of overlying land.

Under riparian

rights, if an upstream user takes so much water that
downstream users have less than they desire, conflicts
occur.

For groundwater, this system is basically the En

glish rule of absolute ownership, which allows overlying
landowners to pump as much water as they wish, even though
this may deplete water for other users.
This problem of conflicts between upstream and down
stream users under a system of riparian rights led to its
modification.

Under riparian rights modified by reasonable
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use, upstream users are allowed to divert as much water as
they need as long as they are putting it to use on the ri
parian lands.

The riparian right does not allow water

transfers out of the watershed, because it is still linked
to the

riverside or overlying lands.

Because riparian

rights

are not to specific quantities

of water and may be

overridden by uses deemed more reasonable, they are quite
uncertain.

They are only workable where water is relatively

abundant.
Riparian rights originated in England and the eastern
United

States, where water is plentiful.

United

States, mid-nineteenth century

veloped prior appropriation law.
and also diverted flows.

In the western

gold rush miners de

Miners panned in streams

To keep their production going,

they needed secure rights to specific quantities of water,
and this is what prior appropriation law provided.
appropriation law spread from mining to farming.

Prior
It allowed

irrigation water to be carried far from riparian lands and
thus made agriculture in arid regions feasible.

Because

water was so scarce, prior appropriation law also carried
use restrictions.
lost.

Any unused right, though prior, would be

Prior appropriation law was developed by those who

used the scarce resource.

It was not imposed by legal au

thorities.
This changed shortly after the gold rush.
Cuzan summarizes what followed:

Alfred G.

"The history of water poli
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cies since 1860 is one of expropriation of property rights
by federal, state, and local governments"

(1983,20).

Pri

vate water rights were converted to usufructury rights.
Holders of these rights could use the water, but the state
owned it.

Water rights became similar to lease holds.

De

termination of beneficial use became a matter for legisla
tive administration.

Simple nonuse was no longer the only

indication that a right was now available for someone else
to use.

Uses were ranked by class, so that municipal use

eventually gained a higher rank over irrigation, and commer
cial and industrial use ranked third (Hirshleifer, De Haven,
and Milliman 1970,233).

Eventually, prior appropriation in

time was transformed into priority of status by use, admin
istratively determined.

If two applications for water use

were made at the same time, the one intended for a higher
ranked use was given the right.

Then that right was re

spected as prior in time to any later applications, even if
the later applications were for higher ranked uses.

In

times of drought, however, rights may revert to higherranked uses, regardless of priority in time.
One additional type of legal arrangement for water
rights to groundwater originated in California.
doctrine of correlative rights.
rights with beneficial use.

This is the

It is similar to riparian

All overlying landowners have

coequal rights, subject to reasonable use.

Essentially,

slices of the water pie are granted proportional to use, and
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when the whole pie shrinks, the slices shrink, but not their
relative size.

This type of rights arrangement does not

guarantee a physical quantity of water.
Of these several different systems for dealing with wa
ter rights, prior appropriation generates the least con
flicts and allows the most efficient use of the resource.
Hirshleifer, De Haven, and Milliman point out that in water
markets, senior water rights would sell for more than junior
rights, and "this answers the question of 'fairness1; the
junior appropriator has paid less for his right than the se
nior user did, the latter's price incorporating a kind of
drought insurance premium"

(1970,236).

These authors favor

solid property rights to water unqualified by judicial or
administrative determination of beneficial use, and they
also favor market transfers of rights.
Markets would also take care of nonuse.

Rather than

forcing loss of rights to unused water, water unused by the
rights holder could be sold to someone else who had a use
for it.

And, as with any other valuable commodity, a water

right holder might prefer not to sell in the expectation of
an even higher future price.

This speculation would provide

buffers against droughts.
Each state has the right to adopt whichever type of wa
ter law it chooses.
state waters.

Many western states assume control over

The terminology varies from "property of the

state" to "property of the people of the state" to "property
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of the public"
1970,248).

(Hirshleifer, de Haven, and Milliman

Federal water law pertains primarily to water

ways that pass through several states.

Federal control over

national waters is based on interstate commerce powers of
Congress, because waterways were important arteries of
commerce.

The federal role has been expanded from the New-

lands Reclamation Act of 1902 which allowed federal subsidy
of and control over irrigation projects.

Federal control of

water was expanded to flood control and now also includes
hydroelectric projects.

Twenty-five federal agencies ad

minister federal water.

The most significant are the Bureau

of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers, but the Soil
Conservation Service,

for example, is also involved to

control loss of topsoil through run-off.

The Bureau of

Reclamation deals primarily with irrigation, while the Army
Corps of Engineers also administers hydroelectric, naviga
tion and flood control projects.
Hirshleifer, de Haven, and Milliman characterize the
current situation in water law as practically socialized:
"It is rather important to note the relatively limited roles
which private decision-making and the market process are
presently permitted to play in the development and use of
water resources.

With the possible exception of nuclear en

ergy, no other basic resource is subject to more public and
centralized control; no other resource is less subject to
allocation through the market-price system"

(1970,223).
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These authors recommend that administrative control over
water resource decisions be weakened because a water com
mission "cannot have the detailed knowledge or capacity to
integrate that knowledge possessed by the alternative allo
cation process- decentralized decision-making co-ordinated
through the market"

(1970,254).

In addition, they recommend

that water law follow prior appropriation, that rights be
unambiguous and certain, and that transfers of rights be al
lowed.

Cuzan's recommendation follows his demonstration

that public planning is inferior to private planning in mar
kets: "What is needed for the efficient allocation of water
resources in the U.S. is not greater public planning but
better functioning markets"

(1979,325).

Although unrestricted prior appropriation is superior
to other systems of water rights, conflicts may still arise.
For example, one person's pumping may make another's more
expensive.

As the water level in the aquifer drops,

costs more to pump it up and out against gravity.

it

One well

can create a cone of depression around it which might cause
nearby shallower wells to run dry.
overcome in a number of ways.

These problems could be

Hirshleifer, de Haven, and

Milliman refer to these infringements on the rights of other
water users as "spillover costs."

For an aquifer, these au

thors suggest that water rights to pump should clearly
specify the conditions under which the user exercises his
right.

For example, a senior holder might be given the
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right to pump water against a certain lift.

When the pump

ing of junior rights holders causes the lift to increase,
the junior rights holders should compensate the senior
rights holder (1970,245).
PRIVATE COOPERATION
The oil industry has had to deal with problems of mul
tiple wells in one field.

In addition to the problems of

depression cones, if oil is pumped out too fast, secondary
recovery of remaining oil can be prohibitively expensive or
impossible by today's technology.

Coordinated pumping of

all wells in the field can thus increase the overall yield.
Given this opportunity cost for a lack of cooperation, the
industry did attempt to coordinate its pumping.
The oil industry has been exhaustively examined by
Robert Bradley of the Institute for Energy Research in Hous
ton, Texas.

He found that state antitrust laws passed be

ginning in the 1890's created barriers to cooperation in the
oil industry.

Later, in the mid 1940's, states relaxed an

titrust laws for the oil and gas industry.

Shortly there

after, however, states passed laws that mandated cooperative
operation (compulsory pooling or unitization) of oil fields.
In most states, the window of opportunity for coopera
tion was open and shut before a breath of free market air
could get into the industry: usually states relaxed an
titrust law and imposed mandatory pooling or unitization in
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the same year.

But a few more extensive periods of cooper

ation occurred in some states.

Over 1,000 voluntary uniti

zation agreements occurred in Texas between 1949 and 1977.
In California between 1929 and 1971, oil producers formed
over 100 operating units (Bradley 1990).

This evidence con

tradicts claims that because of "imperfect information" in
formation and transaction costs are prohibitive so that
"contractual failure" must occur (Libecap and Wiggins 1985;
Wiggins and Libecap 1985).

Thus, while there may be obsta

cles to cooperation, they are not insurmountable.

As evi

denced by the oil and gas industry, it is clear that cooper
ative operation of fluid underground resources can occur in
the free market.
Terry Anderson has written extensively on water prob
lems and has searched the past and other countries for inno
vative free market solutions.

For example, he found that in

England and Scotland, fishermen's clubs pay dues to maintain
privately owned trout streams.

On some small streams in

Montana, the law does not require ranch owners to allow free
access to "public waterways;" they can collect fees from
fisherman and afford to fence streams.

Cattle cannot

destroy the stream banks and trout habitat is preserved.
Some ranchers even convert from cattle to trout because the
sportfishing demand is a better source of income (Anderson
1990,144-146).

"Environmental entrepreneurs in organiza

tions such as The Nature Conservancy and Trout Unlimited
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play an important role in creating private rights and cap
turing the benefits of environmental amenities of instream
flows.

. . . entrepreneurs in ranching and farming can ac

complish similar results"

(Anderson 1991,108).

Most con

sumers of environmental goods would probably agree that a
cool, lush, trout stream is preferable to overgrazed range
and muddy water holes.

The free market provides this envi

ronmental good.
AQUIFER PRIVATIZATION
Anderson's book, Water Rights. contains a proposal for
groundwater privatization.

The theoretical model, origi

nated by Oscar Burt and developed by David Fractor in his
dissertation, presents a stock and flow approach to water
rights in groundwater (Anderson, Burt, and Fractor 1983;
Fractor 1982)

Property titles to stocks and flows of water

were also proposed by Vernon L. Smith (1977).
The important parameters in an aquifer are the stock of
groundwater, the pumping rate, and the lift.

Because lift

and stock are inversely related (as the water level de
creases, the lift is greater), either variable can be used
in conjunction with pumping rate to estimate the net eco
nomic value of production in an aquifer for every set of
other relevant parameters such as labor or capital.
For any period of time, the stock of groundwater is
equal to net natural recharge (precipitation and surface
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flows can seep back down into the basin, or more water may
flow in from other underground reservoirs) minus the amount
pumped out in that year.

The marginal value of a stock of

groundwater is related to the marginal pumping rate. Assum
ing a constant rate for a certain interval of time, for ex
ample a year, the marginal value of groundwater stocks is
the rate of change of the annual net economic value of pro
duction of the aquifer with respect to the stock of ground
water, divided by the interest rate.

The mathematical model

uses partial derivatives to express this relationship but
for a simple grasp it is just the economic value of the
basin at the end of the year, minus the value at the begin
ning of the year, divided by the stock of groundwater, dis
counted by the interest rate.
Some simplifying assumptions are made in the model but
could be eliminated when the specific features of a basin
are known.

For example, outlying wells go dry as the water

level decreases, and cones of depression might make some
wells dry or inefficient.

The model looked at an equilib

rium condition in which pumping rates were constant.

They

might actually fluctuate widely depending on drought or
flood.

Returns to the aquifer from water previously pumped

out are ignored.

The uses to which the water is put can

change with time, which would change the value of the water
used.

All of these contingencies could be managed with ex

perience.

Given the necessary data and continuous monitor
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ing to maintain it, it is likely that owners would form a
corporation and seek a team of hydrologists and others to
manage the aquifer on their behalf.
Cooperative management of a basin would be only part of
the free market provision of water.

This would guarantee

private ownership of the productive factor.

There would

also have to be a market for the productive factor.

There

fore, stock and flow rights and property titles to the water
would have to be freely exchangeable.
Depending on how the corporation would manage the
aquifer, decisions to ship water out of the basin might be
made.

If a potential purchaser offered more for the water

than the water would bring in its current use, the team
would have to balance that greater income with any likeli
hood that return flows and thus stock levels would be perma
nently reduced.

This does not seem different from a company

having to decide whether to sell a facility when offered a
high price, even though because it would lose the facility
it would have less output in the future.

These are ques

tions of technical business management and finance which are
beyond the scope of this paper.
The likely scenario for production of water from
aquifers is that a capitalist-entrepreneur (including many
small shareholders) would invest in a corporation to provide
the necessary pumping and hydrological monitoring equipment,
local meteorological information services, and engineering
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and management services to maintain and enhance shareholder
value.
In summary, private cooperative management of groundwa
ter aquifers and markets for rights to that water are the
solution to private water provision.

100

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, Curt L. and Jerrold M. Peterson. 198 5. Water Allo
cation: The Roles of Value and Prices. Journal of Envi
ronmental Systems 15 (1): 71-76.
Anderson, Frederick R . , Allen V. Kneese, Phillip D. Reed,
Russell B. Stevenson, and Serge Taylor. 1977. Environ
mental Improvement Through Economic Incentives. Wash
ington, D.C.: Resources for the Future; distributed by
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
Anderson, Terry L. 1982. Institutional Underpinnings of the
Water Crisis. The Cato Journal 2 (3, Winter): 759-792.
— — . 1983. Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought. Balti
more: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press; the Cato Insti
tute.
. 1989. The Market Process and Environmental Amenities.
Chapter 4 in Walter Block, ed. Economics and the Envi
ronment: A Reconciliation. Vancouver, Canada: The
Fraser Institute, 137-157.
., ed. 1983. Water Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation.
Bureaucracy, and the Environment. San Francisco: Pa
cific Institute for Public Policy Research.
Anderson, Terry L. and Donald R. Leal. 1991. Free Market En
vironmentalism. San Francisco, California: Pacific Re
search Institute for Public Policy.
Anderson, Terry L . , Oscar R. Burt, and David T. Fractor.
1983. Privatizing Groundwater Basins: A Model and Its
Application. Chapter 7 in Terry L. Anderson, ed., Water
Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation. Bureaucracy, and
the Environment. San Francisco, California: Pacific In
stitute for Public Policy Research, 223-248.
Anderson, Terry L. and P. J. Hill. 1975. The Evolution of
Property Rights: A Study of the American West. Journal
of Law and Economics 18 (April):163-179.
Baden, John. 1979. Politics and Western Resources: Introduc
tion. Western Political Quarterly 32(3): 254-255.

101

. 1987. Crimes Against Nature: Public Funding of Environ
mental Destruction. Policy Review (Winter):36-40.
Baden, John, and Richard L. Stroup, eds. 1981. Bureaucracy
vs. Environment: The Environmental Costs of Bureau
cratic Governance. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
Bagley, Edgar S. 1958 . Water Rights Law and Public Polices
Relating to Ground Water "Mining" in the Southwestern
States. Journal of Law and Economics 1 (October): 144174.
Bandow, Doug, ed. 1986. Protecting the Environment: A Free
Market Strategy. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Founda
tion.
Baumol, William J. and Wallace E. Oates. 1975. The Theory of
Environmental Policy: Externalities, public outlays,
and the gualitv of life. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
. 1979. Economics. Environmental Policy, and the Quality
of Life. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Belt, Jerry M . , Jr. 1991. Interview with author. Las Vegas,
Nevada, Las Vegas Valley Water District.
Benson, Bruce L. 1990. The Enterprise of Law: Justice With
out the State. San Francisco, California: Pacific Re
search Institute for Public Policy.
Block, Walter. 1977. Coase and Demsetz on Private Property
Rights. Journal of Libertarian Studies 1 (2): 111-115.
., ed. 1990. Economics and the Environment: A Reconcilia
tion. Vancouver, B.C.: The Fraser Institute.
Bohi, Douglas R. and Michael A. Toman. 1983. Understanding
Nonrenewable Resource Supply Behavior. Science 219
(February 25): 927-932.
Bohm-Bawerk, Eugen Von. 1891. The Positive Theory of Capi
tal . Translated by William Smart. New York: GE.
Stechert & Co.
. 1959. Capital and Interest. 3 vols. Translated by
George D. Huncke and Hans F. Sennholz. South Holland,
Illinois: Libertarian Press.
Bradley, Robert. 1990. Oil, Gas, and Government: The U.S.
Experience. Houston, Texas: Institute for Energy Re
search . Photocopy.

102

Bramwell, Anna. 1989. Ecology in the 20th Century: A His
t or y . New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Brown, Gardner Jr. and Robert Deacon. 1972. Economic Opti
mization of a Single-Cell Aquifer. Water Resources Re
search 8 (3): 557-564.
Burt, Oscar R. 1970. Groundwater Storage Control under In
stitutional Restrictions. Water Resources Research 6
(6): 1540-1548.
Cheung, Steven N. S. 1970. The Structure of a Contract and
the Theory of a Non-exclusive Resource. Journal of Law
and Economics 13 (April): 49-70.
Clawson, Marion. 1980. Wilderness as One of Many L^tnd Uses.
Idaho Law Review 16(3): 449-468.
. [1959] 1981. Methods of Measuring the Demand for and
Value of Outdoor Recreation. Reprint #10. Washington,
D.C.: Resources for the Future.
Coase, Ronald H. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal
of Law and Economics 3 (October): 1-44.
. 1974. The Lighthouse in Economics. Journal of Law and
Economics 1 7 (October): 357-376.
Cuzan, Alfred G. 1979. A Critique of Collectivist Water Re
sources Planning. The Western Political Quarterly
32(3): 320-326.
. 1983. Appropriators versus Expropriators: The Political
Economy of Water in the West. Chapter 1 in Terry L. An 
derson, ed. Water Rights: Scarce Resource Allocation
Bureaucracy, and the Environment. San Francisco, Cali
fornia: Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research,
13-43.
d'Arge, Ralph C. and Allen V. Kneese. 1980. State Liability
for International Environmental Degradation: an Eco
nomic Perspective. Natural Resources Journal 2 0 (July):
427-250.
David, E. L. and H. M. Peskin. 1984. The USGS National Water
Use Data System: An Optimal Data Base? Review of Public
Data Use 12: 97-105.
Deader, David. 1989. Privatization: an Emerging Management
and Financing Trend. Water/Engineering & Management
March: 44-49.
Demsetz, Harold. 1968. Why Regulate Utilities? Journal of
Law and Economics. April:55-65.

103

Dorfman, R. 1959. A Graphical Exposition of Bohm-Bawerk's
Interest Theory. Review of Economic Studies 26: 153158.
Easterbrook, Gregg. 1990. Everything You Know About the En
vironment is Wrong. The New Republic 202(18): 14-27.
Echard, Jo Kwong. 1990. Protecting the Environment: Old
Rhetoric. New Imperatives. Washington, D.C.: Capital
Research Center.
Eheart, J. Wayland and Randolph M. Lyon. 1983. Alternative
Structures for Water Rights Markets. Water Resources
Research 19(4): 887-894.
Evers, Williamson M . , comp. 1990. The Environment: A Bibli
ography. Auburn, Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Insti
tute . Photocopy.
Fetter, Frank A. 1977. Capital. Interest, and Rent: Essavs
in the Theory of Distribution. Edited by Murray N.
Rothbard. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews & McMeel; Insti
tute for Humane Studies.
Fox, Stephen R. 1985. The American Conservation Movement:
John Muir and His Legacy. Madison, Wisconsin: Univer
sity of Wisconsin Press.
Fractor, David Todd. 1982. A Property Rights Approach to
Groundwater Management. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University
Microfilms International.
Frederick, Kenneth D. 1989. The Nation's Water Resources:
Past Trends and Current Challenges. Discussion paper.
Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.
Frederick, Kenneth D. and Allen V. Kneese. 1984. Competition
for Water. Chapter 3 in Water Scarcity, edited by
Ernest A. Engelbert with Ann Foley Scheuring, 82-108.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press.
Gardner, B. Delworth. 1982. Common Property Issues in Manag
ing Groundwater and the Public Lands. Paper prepared
for Journalist Conference, Center for Political Economy
and Natural Resources, Big Sky, Montana, July 11-16,
1982.
. 1986. Removing Impediments to Water Markets. Institute
Perspective 7. Reprint version of paper presented at
the American Agricultural Economics Association, July
28, 1986, Reno, Nevada. Logan, Utah: Institute of Po
litical Economy, Utah State University.

104
Gibbons, Diana C. 1986. The Economic Value of Water. Wash
ington, D.C.: Resources for the Future; distributed by
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

Gisser, Micha and David A. Sanchez. 1980. Competition Versus
Optimal Control in Groundwater Pumping. Water Resources
Research 16(4): 638-642.
Godwin, R. Kenneth and W. Bruce Shepard. 1979. Forcing
Squares, Triangles and Ellipses into a Circular
Paradigm: The Use of the Commons Dilemma in Examining
the Allocation of Common Resources. The Western Politi
cal Quarterly. 32 (3):265-277.
Gordon, H. Scott. 1954. The Economic Theory of a CommonProperty Resource: The Fishery. The Journal of Politi
cal Economy 62: 124-142.
. 1958. Economics and the Conservation Question. The
Journal of Law and Economics l(October): 110-121.
Hanke, Steve H. 1973. Potential for Marginal Cost Pricing in
Water Resource Management. Water Resources Research
9(4): 808-825.
. 1975. Water Rates: An Assessment of Current Issues.
Journal of the American Waterworks Association 67(5):
215-219.
. 1976. Options for Financing Water Development Projects.
Reprint. Transactions of the 41st North American
Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference 142-152.
Washington, D.C.: Wildlife Management Institute.
. 1979. On the Price Elasticity Debate. Journal of Ameri
can Water Works Association December: 11.
. 1981a. On the Feasibility of Benefit-cost Analysis.
Public Policy 29(2, Spring): 147-157.
—— . 1981b. On the Marginal Cost of Water Supply. Water En
gineering & Management February: 60-64.
. 1982. The Privatization Debate: An Insider's View. The
Cato Journal 2(3, Winter): 653-662.
Hanke, Steve H. and Abraham Mehrez. 1979. An Optimal Sam
pling Procedure for the Collection of Residential Water
Use Data. Water Resources Research 15(6): 1343-1348.
Hanke, Steve H. and Lennart de Mare. 1982. Residential Water
Demand: A Pooled, Time Series, Cross Section Study of
Malmo, Sweden. Water Resources Bulletin paper no.

105
81129, American Water Resources Association 18(4): 621625.

Hanke, Steve H. and Robert K. Davis. 1971. Demand Management
Through Responsive Pricing. Journal of the American Wa
ter Works Association :555-560.
Hanke, Steve H. and Stephen J. K. Walters. 1987. Privatizing
Waterworks. In Prospects for Privatization, edited by
Steve H. Hanke, 104-113. New York: The Academy of Po
litical Science.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science
1 62(December 13):1243-1248.
Hardin, Garrett, and John Baden. 1977. Managing the Commons.
San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1936. The Mythology of Capital. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics February: 199-228.
. The Maintenance of Capital. Chapter 3 in Profits. In
terest and Investment. New York: Augustus M. Kelley,
83-134.
. [1941] 1975. The Pure Theory of Capital. Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press; Midway Reprint.
. 1984. Money. Capital, and Fluctuations: Early Essays.
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Hays, Samuel P. 1959. Conservation and the Gospel of Effi
ciency; The Progressive Conservation Movement. 18901920. Harvard Historical Monographs XL. Cambridge, Mas
sachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press.
Hirshleifer, J. 1969. A Note on the Bohm-Bawerk/Wicksell
Theory of Interest. Review of Economic Studies 34(98):
191-199.
Hirshleifer, Jack, James C. De Haven, and Jerome W. Milli
man. [1960] 1970. Water Supply: Economics. Technology,
and Policy. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. 1983. Is Research Based on Causal Sci
entific Principles Possible in the Social Sciences? Ra
tio 25(1): 31-38.
. 1988. From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics
of Libertarianism. In Walter Block and Llewellyn H.
Rockwell, Jr., eds., Man. Economy, and Liberty: Essays
in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard. Auburn, Alabama: The
Ludwig von Mises Institute.

106
. 1989a. A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism: Economics.
Politics, and Ethics. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publish
ers.

. 1989b. Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the
Production of Security. The Journal of Libertarian
Studies 9(1): 29-46.
—— . 1990. De-Socialization in a United Germany: An Assess
ment of West and East German History and Policy and a
Radical Proposal for Reunification. Ludwig von Mises
Institute Occasional Paper Series, No. 4. Auburn, Al
abama: Ludwig
von Mises Institute.
Horwitz, Morton J.
1977. The Transformation of American Law
1780-1860. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press.
Hotelling, Harold.
1931. The Economics of Exhaustible Re
sources. The Journal of Political Economy 39(2): 137175.
Johnson, Ronald N. and Gary D. Libecap. 1982. Contracting
Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery. The
American Economic Review 72(5): 1005-1022.
Jones, Holway R. 1965. John Muir and the Sierra Club: The
Battle for Yosemite. San Francisco: the Sierra Club.
Kant, Immanuel. [1785] 1959. Foundations of the Metaphysics
of Morals. Translated by Louis White Beck. Indianapo
lis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Kirzner, Israel M. 1966. An Essav on Capital. New York: Au
gustus M. Kelley.
Kneese, Allen V. 1984. Measuring the Benefits of Clean Air
and Wat e r . Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future;
distributed by Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kneese, Allen V. and Gilbert Bonem. 1986. Hypothetical
Shocks to Water Allocation Institutions in the Colorado
Basin. In New Courses for the Colorado River: Maior Is
sues for the Next Century. 87-108, edited by Gary
Weatherford and F. Lee Brown. Albuquerque, New Mexico:
Univ. of New Mexico Press.
Kneese, Allen V . , Shaul Ben-David, and William D. Schulze.
1983. The Ethical Foundations of Benefit-Cost Analysis.
Chapter 4 in Energy and the Future, edited by Douglas
MacLean and Peter G. Brown, 59-74. Totowa, New Jersey:
Rowman & Allanheld, Littlefield, Adams & Co.
Kneese, Allen V. and Blair T. Bower. [1968] 1984. Managing
Water Quality: Economics. Technology. Institutions.

107

Reprint. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future;
distributed by Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kneese, Allen V., Robert U. Ayres, and Ralph C. D'Arge.
1970. Economics and the Environment: A Materials Bal
ance Approach. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Fu
ture.
Knight, Frank. 1935. Professor Hayek and the Theory of In
vestment. The Economic Journal. March: 77-94.
Krutilla, John V. 1979. Economics and the Environment: A
Time for Taking Stock. In Environmental Economics: Pa
pers Presented at the National Conference, Canberra,
29-30 May 1978, 5-12, edited by G. Gorrie. Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service.
Krutilla, John V . , Anthony C. Fisher, William F. Hyde, and
V. Kerry Smith. 1983. Public versus Private Ownership:
The Federal Lands Case. Journal of Policy Analysis and
Management 2(4): 548-558.
Leoni, Bruno. [1961] 1972. Freedom and The L a w . Los Angeles:
Nash Publishing.
Libecap, Gary D. and Steven N. Wiggins. 1985. The Influence
of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case
of Oil Field Unitization. Journal of Political Economy
93(4): 690-714.
Linaweaver, F. P. Jr., John C. Geyer, and Jerome B. Wolff.
1967. Summary Report on the Residential Water Use Re
search Project. Journal of the American Water Works As
sociation 59(3): 267-282.
Lochhead, Carolyn. 1990. Save the Earth and Ruin the World:
Hype, Half-truths and The Greenhouse Effect. Insight
6(16): 8-18.
Locke, John. 1970. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by
Peter Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maass, Arthur. 1966. Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to
Public Investment Decisions. Quarterly Journal of Eco
nomics 80(2): 208-226.
Machlup, Fritz. 1935. The Consumption of Capital in Austria.
Review of Economic Statistics:13-19.
Martin, Dolores T. 1983. Divestiture and the Creation of
Property Rights in Public Lands: A Comment. The Cato
Journal 2(3): 687-690.

108
Martin, William E . , Helen M. Ingram, Nancy K. Laney, and
Adrian H. Griffin. 1984. Savina Water in a Desert City.
Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future; distributed
by Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

Matulich, Scott C. 1982. The New Political Economy of Natu
ral Resources: Discussion. American Journal of Agricul
tural Economics:944-946.
Milliman, J. W. 1962. Can People Be Trusted with Natural Re
sources? Land Economics 38(August): 199-218.
Mises, Ludwig von. 1952. Planning for Freedom. Spring Mills,
Pennsylvania: Libertarian Press.
. 1966. Human Action: A Treatise on Economics. 3rd ed.,
rev. Chicago: Yale University Press, Contemporary
Books; Henry Regnery.
. 1976. Epistemoloaical Problems of Economics. Translated
by George Reisman.
New York: New York University
Press; The Institute for Humane Studies.
. [1962] 1978. The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Sci
ence: An Essav on Method. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews
and McMeel, Inc.
—— . [1936] 1981. Socialism: An Economic and Sociological
Analysis. Translated by J. Kahane. Indianapolis: LibertyClassics.
. [1957] 1985. Theory and History: An Interpretation of
Social and Economic Evolution. Auburn, Alabama: The
Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Oppenheimer, Franz. [1914] 1975. The State. Translated by
John Gitterman. New York: Free Life Editions, Inc.
Orbell, John M. 1979. The Governance of Rivers. The Western
Political Quarterly 32(3): 256-264.
Orr, Lloyd D. 1979. Social Costs, Incentive Structures, and
Environmental Policies. Western Political Quarterly
32(5): 286-297.
Portney, Paul R. 1988. Reforming Environmental Regulation:
Three Modest Proposals. Issues in Science and Technol
ogy 4 (2): 74-81.
Ragan, Mark Lawrence. 1991. Amid Big Water Fight, California
Is Still Dry. Insight January 14: 20-22.

109

Reisner, Marc. [1986] 1987. Cadillac Desert: The American
West and its Disappearing Water. Reprint. New York:
Viking; Penguin Books.
Rothbard, Murray N. 1956. Concerning Water. Letter. The
Freeman 6(3): 61-64.
. 1970. Man. Economy, and State: A Treatise on Economic
Principles. Los Angeles: Nash Publishing.
. [1970] 1977a. Power and Market: Government and the
Economy. Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel; Insti
tute for Humane Studies.
. 1977b. Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare
Economics. Center for Libertarian Studies Occasional
Paper Series No. 3. New York: Center for Libertarian
Studies.
. 1978. For A New Liberty; The Libertarian Manifesto. 2d
rev. ed. New York: Macmillan, Collier.
. 1979. Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social
Sciences. San Francisco: Cato Institute.
. 1982a. Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution. The
Cato Journal 2 (1): 55-99.
. 1982b. The Ethics of Liberty. Atlantic Highlands, New
Jersey: Humanities Press.
Saliba, Bonnie Colby and David B. Bush. 1987. Water Markets
in Theory and Practice: Market Transfers. Water Values,
and Public Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press;
Frederick A. Praeger.
Scott, Anthony. 1955. The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole
Ownership. Journal of Political Economy 63(2): 116-124.
. [1955] 1973. Natural Resources: The Economics of Con
servation. Toronto, Canada: McClelland and Stewart Lim
ited.
Sharefkin, Mark F . , Mordechai Shechter, and Allen V. Kneese.
1983. Impacts, Costs and Techniques for Mitigation of
Contaminated Groundwater. In Papers for and a Summary
of a Workshop on Groundwater Resources and Contamina
tion in the United States. 93-126. NSF PRA Report 8312, Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation.
Smith, Barry. 1986. Austrian Economics and Austrian Philoso
phy. In Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophi
cal Background, edited by Wolfgang Grassl and Barry
Smith. New York: New York Univ. Press.

110

Smith, Rodney T. 1984. Troubled Waters: Financing Water in
the Wes t . Washington, D.C.: Council of State Planning
Agencies.
. 1988a. Having Water On Tap: Drought Insurance Through
Water Trades. Water Strategist 2(1): 1-2, 11-13.
. 1988b. Trading Water: An Economic and Legal Framework
for Water Marketing. Washington, D.C.: Council of State
Policy & Planning Agencies.
Smith, Vernon L. 1977. Water Deeds: A Proposed Solution to
the Water Valuation Problem. Arizona Review 26(1): 710 .
. 1982. On Divestiture and the Creation of Property
Rights in Public Lands. The Cato Journal 2(3): 663-685.
Smith, V. Kerry. 1980. The Evaluation of Natural Resource
Adequacy: Elusive Quest or Frontier of Economic Analy
sis? Land Economics 56(3): 257-298.
Smith, V. Kerry and John V. Krutilla. 1979. Resource and En
vironmental Constraints to Growth. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 61(3): 395-408.
Stroup, Richard L. 1990. Environmental Policy: A Property
Rights Perspective. Environmental Hotline 7(3): 4.
Taylor, Thomas C. [1980] 1983. An Introduction to Austrian
Economics. Reprint. Auburn, Alabama: The Ludwig von
Mises Institute; Washington, D.C: Cato Institute.
The Economist. 1989. Costing the Earth: A Survey of the En
vironment. The Economist 3 1 2 (September 2): special sec
tion after p.38, 1-18.
Tietenberg, T. H. 1990. Using Economic Incentives to Main
tain Our Environment. Challenge March-April: 42-46.
Toman, Michael A. 1986. "Depletion Effects" and Nonrenewable
Resource Supply: A Diagrammatic Exposition. Land Eco
nomics 62(4): 341-352.
United States General Accounting Office. 1989. Water Subsi
dies: Basic Changes Needed to Avoid Abuse of the 960Acre Limit. A report of the Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division, GAO/RCED-90-6.
United States Geological Survey. 1985. National Water Sum
mary 1984: Hydrologic Events. Selected Water-Oualitv
Trends and Ground-Water Resources. United States Geo-

Ill

logical Survey Water-Supply Paper 2275. Washington,
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office.
United States Geological Survey. 1986. Regional Aouifer-Svstem Analysis Program: Summary of Projects. 1978-1984.
Ed. Ren Jen Sun. U.S. Geological Survey Circular 1002.
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Of
fice.
Wahl, Richard W. 1989. Markets for Federal Water: Subsidies.
Property Rights, and the Bureau of Reclamation. Wash
ington, D.C.: Resources for the Future; distributed by
Johns Hopkins University Press.

